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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Political Constraints, Incentives, and  
Individual Economic Behavior 
 
Steven F. Kreft 
 
 This dissertation is a collection of papers that features applications of public 
choice theory to the relationship between political constraints, incentives, and individual 
economic behavior. The first chapter introduces the two meanings of political 
constraints—(i) constraints self-imposed on the political process and (ii) constraints 
created by the political process; reviews the public choice literature on political 
constraints and incentives; and outlines the research agenda for the dissertation. Chapter 
2 examines the possible inefficiencies that may be produced by politicians pursuing their 
own self interests by comparing two forms of city government. More specifically, 
comparisons are made between professionally trained city managers and popularly 
elected mayors, and results show that city managers have a relative efficiency advantage 
over elected mayors. Chapter 3 analyzes how minimum drinking age laws influence 
drinking behavior by examining the incentive for underage U.S. citizens to cross 
international border crossings to avoid the nationally uniform 21-year-old drinking age. 
Results show that the occurrence of alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities, the most 
serious outcome of mixing drinking and driving, increases as proximity to the nearest 
border crossing decreases. Chapter 4 enhances the reported link between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth, tests the causal relationship between venture 
funding and entrepreneurial activity, and ultimately reveals which policies create a good 
environment for entrepreneurship. Results show that entrepreneurial activity draws 
venture funding to an area, and not vice versa. Therefore, the results suggest that enacting 
policies consistent with economic freedom, such as low taxes, low regulations, and 
secure property rights that provide a good environment for attracting or developing 
individual entrepreneurs, are the appropriate economic development policies. Chapter 5 
summarizes the major findings of the research chapters, reviews the importance of the 
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Political Constraints, Incentives, and Individual Economic Behavior 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrote "It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest." This idea that individual self- interest is the primary factor that 
motivates individual behavior has long been applied to most areas of economic thought; 
however, it wasn’t until recently that it was used to analyze the behavior of individuals in 
government. Public Choice theory argues that each government official is ultimately in 
office to achieve the goals of their own self- interest. Therefore, Public Choice theory 
allows economists to analyze the behavior of individuals in government by using the 
same tools that they employ to analyze individual economic behavior—the idea that 
individual incentives matter, even for government officials. 
 One aspect of public choice analysis focuses on the effect that political constraints 
have on individual economic behavior. Generally, the term “political constraint” can have 
two different meanings—(i) constraints self-imposed on the political process and (ii) 
constraints created by the political process. The first meaning, constraints self- imposed 
on the political process, refers to constraints that limit a government official’s ability to 
pursue his/her own self- interest. These constraining forces include such things as 
constitutional laws, voting rules, election mechanisms, and many other factors. The 
second meaning, constraints created by the political process, refers to the government-
created constraints imposed on individual participants of the economy. These 
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constraining forces are such things as an established and enforced system of private 
property, a legal system of laws and regulations, enactment of mandatory taxes, and 
many other factors.    
Pertaining to the first meaning of political constraints—those that are self-
imposed on the political process, much of the ongoing public choice literature is devoted 
to analyzing constitutional laws, voting rules, and election mechanisms. Several 
influential authors have stressed the role of constitutions in limiting the coercive powers 
of government and protecting the rights of citizens. For example, Nobel Laureate James 
Buchanan (1990), who literally founded the field of constitutional economics, insists on 
the importance of constitutional rules to limit the powers of government. Likewise, 
Holcombe (1991) states that the optimal constitution would prevent governments from 
performing inefficient activities, while at the same time, allowing it to engage in efficient 
activities. In order to achieve this relationship, the author believes a constitution needs to 
contain a clearly defined set of rules for the government to follow, in order to enforce a 
clearly defined structure of rights under which citizens function. The rules should include 
specific voting procedures, such as unanimous or majority voting rules; well defined 
sources for government funds, such as different types of permissible taxation policies; a 
framework for a judicial system to perform conflict resolution; and finally, should 
incorporate a mechanism for amending new rules to the constitution as the times change. 
Again, constitutional constraints (rules) are needed to constrain government officials, 
who are rationally self-motivated, from enacting policies and projects that only serve 
their own self interest regardless of the economic ramifications.  
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However, as the literature on the political process and voting mechanisms has 
shown, politicians have found ways to make choices that achieve their own self interests 
despite the constraints imposed upon them. The political process model developed by 
Downs (1957) shows that political representatives, in the context of a democracy, will try 
to align their political positioning with the median voter’s preferences under majority 
voting. This comes from the election, or re-election, motivation of each elected official. 
Political representatives are vote maximizers, and thus, their ultimate goal is to achieve at 
least a majority of the eligible votes. The median voter’s desired production of any public 
good or service does not necessarily align itself with the efficient level of production; It 
just ensures that the politician, who gains the median voter’s support, will garner a 
majority of the votes in any election.  
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) criticize the median voter model and claim that the 
median voter theory does not adequately represent the political process. The authors 
argue that politicians propose voting choices to the electorate, and if a dominant group 
exists in the vote-proposal process, it will have monopoly power in setting the voting 
agenda. This monopoly-powered agenda setter may or may not offer the median voter’s 
preferences. In this context the agenda setter will offer voters a “take- it or leave- it” 
choice, where “leaving- it” refers to going back to a status quo. The electorate is assumed 
to not be able to influence the voting agenda because of the agenda setter’s monopoly 
power and the lack of immediate political competition. The distortions in the vote-
proposal process may lead to further inefficiencies, in that the monopoly power of 
politicians can lead to excessive levels of public good production. 
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Another efficiency criticism of government that comes from the incentive to vote 
maximize is based on the occur rence of rent-seeking special interest groups, which 
politicians will have incentive to align with in order to gain more political support. 
Tullock (1967) noted that the dollars rent-seeking individuals spend on political influence 
will be equal to the dollars such individuals expect to receive from the implementation of 
the desired government policy or project. The rent-seeking expenditures are seen as a 
waste of resources, because they are expenditures that would not have occurred without 
the presence of the government projects. Also, Tullock (1967) argues that in many 
instances, one group will undertake expenditures solely to counter the political influence 
of another group’s political influence. The author argues that these counter-productive 
rent-seeking expenditures are completely wasteful in the eyes of society as a whole. They 
are expenditures undertaken solely to try and transfer resources from one group to 
another, which is clearly an inefficient process. 
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) develop a model of how legislators distort 
their cost-benefit analysis when trying to achieve their own goal of vote maximizing in 
their own district. The authors basically model the district of an elected politician as a 
special interest group that tries to maximize its benefits regardless of the costs put on 
other districts. The authors assume that the benefits of government projects are 
concentrated in individual districts, while the costs are widespread over all districts. The 
district maximizes its benefits through the efforts of its legislator; therefore, the legislator 
has incentive to advocate policies that correspond to the district’s wishes. More 
specifically, the legislator will have incentive to count some of the in-district resource 
costs as benefits, which goes against normal economic accounting practices. For 
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example, the district’s citizens that are hired to labor on the government projects will not 
be seen as labor costs, but will instead be viewed as increased employment for the 
district. Obviously, the costs of employing the labor are spread over many districts, while 
the one district’s constituents will receive all the benefits of the increased employment.  
The districting system developed by Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) 
allows for legislators to distort costs even further. Since the costs are spread over many 
districts, the districts will each have incentives to raise their costs because they are 
counting on only having to pay a fraction of those increases. However, if every district 
has incentive to inflate costs, they will all end up having to pay for each other’s 
inefficiencies. This is the basic theme of the Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) 
paper, that politicians systematically alter their cost-benefit accounting procedures to 
inflate benefits and decrease their share of costs, so they ultimately implement inefficient 
projects. The projects are inefficient in the sense that they are not the preferred outcomes 
resulting from normal economic accounting criteria.  
Another practice of politicians inflating perceived benefits from a project, while 
making the projects future costs unclear has been coined the “shortsightedness effect” in 
government. Again this rests on the idea that elected government officials have the 
incentive to inflate the perceived benefits of any project in order to maximize their 
influence on voters; while, at the same time, politicians have the incentive to hide the true 
costs of the project. Often times this is achieved by enacting projects that have clearly 
visible, immediate benefits, but have future costs that are difficult for voters to identify. 
An example of the shortsightedness of government is clearly seen whenever governments 
undertake projects that are financed through borrowing. The project will benefit voters 
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upon its completion, but the costs will come in the form of higher future taxes because of 
the borrowed funds. This distortion of the cost benefit accounting system will again, 
often lead to inefficient projects being undertaken more often than if the benefits and 
costs where clearly defined. 
In addition to politicians being characterized as vote maximizers, bureaucratic 
government officials have been modeled as budget maximizers, which will ultimately 
distort the efficiency of government. Niskanen (1968) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980) 
have developed models of political leviathans where bureaucracies are seen to be 
monopolies that provide governments with their services. In this regard, bureaucracies 
will use their monopoly power to maximize their utility functions, which have been 
assumed to contain many power- and prestige-type variables. The model implies that 
bureaucracies can be thought of as budget maximizers, regardless of their motivations for 
existence, because larger budgets will always bring higher utility levels. In contrast to 
their industrial- type counterparts, the political monopolies will tend to overproduce 
public goods and services, ultimately inflating the size of government. 
The second meaning of political constraints—those that are created by the 
political process, deals with the constraining forces that government imposes on 
individuals participating in the economy. Again, these constraining forces are such things 
as an established and enforced system of private property, a legal system of laws and 
regulations, enactment of mandatory taxes, and many other factors. Economists believe 
that individuals are rationally self interested, and therefore, pursue actions that maximize 
their individual utility. This idea that individual self- interest is the primary factor that 
motivates individual behavior has long been applied to most areas of economic thought. 
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Also, the notion that individuals have to make these rational choices under the constraints 
that are created by the political process has long been applied by various strands of 
economic literature. The applications range from the analysis of law and economics, to 
the study of crime and economics, to the examination of the economic impact of taxes. 
 
1.2 Dissertation Research Agenda 
There are three research chapters included in this dissertation that will present specific 
applications of the two meanings of political constraints. Specifically, Chapter 2 deals 
with the constraints that are self- imposed on the political process and the incentives for 
politicians to avoid such constraints to pursue their own interests. While, Chapters 3 and 
4 deal with the constraints that are created by the political process and the influence that 
they have on individual economic behavior.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation deals with a specific example of the possible 
inefficiencies that may be produced by politicians pursuing their own self interests. The 
chapter compares and contrasts two forms of city government, ultimately comparing 
professionally trained city managers to popular elected mayors in order to predict 
efficiency differences in the two forms of government. The motivation is that the elected 
officials will be subject to many of the efficiencies brought on by incentives to vote 
maximize, while the professionally trained city manager, who is removed from direct 
voting influences, will perform more efficiently relative to the popularly elected mayor. 
However, since the city manager is one-step removed from the political process, it might 
give more room for the city manager to shirk—work at the less than normal rate of 
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productivity.  1  Therefore, comparisons of the two forms of government may be 
complicated by contrasting predictions of individual behavior and result in no significant 
differences in efficiency. 
Previous research has concluded that there are no efficiency differences between 
elected mayor-council (EMC) and council-manager (CM) city governments. What 
remains then, is a puzzle as to why so many cities are switching from an EMC form to a 
CM form. The previous literature only examined a limited array of common 
governmental expenditures, while this chapter provides an alternative method of testing 
the relative efficiency of the two forms of government. Relying on capitalization theory 
of local public services and taxes, I develop a hedonic price model for home sales 
occurring in the six largest Ohio metropolitan areas. Results show that houses within a 
CM city have a pricing premium that can be attributed to the greater efficiency of the CM 
form of government. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present specific examples on how certain laws and government 
policies effect individual economic choices and activities. Chapter 3 analyzes how 
minimum drinking age laws influence the behavior of underage citizens. More 
specifically, it examines the incentive for underage U.S. citizens to cross international 
border crossings, into countries with lower drinking ages, to avoid the nationally uniform 
21-year-old drinking age. The chapter models the occurrence of alcohol-related motor-
vehicle fatalities, the most serious outcome of mixing drinking and driving, and tests for 
any border crossing effects. More specifically, I model the occurrence of motor-vehicle 
fatalities in Michigan counties, for drivers aged nineteen and twenty, and all-aged drivers, 
                                                 
1 See Bender and Lott (1996) for a detailed review of the literature on shirking.  
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to test if the lower Ontario drinking age of nineteen creates a significant border crossing 
effect. Results show that, after controlling for the determinants of motor vehicle fatalities 
that are supported by the literature, the county’s proximity to the nearest border crossing 
significantly impacts the occurrence of alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities. 
Specifically, the occurrence of motor-vehicle fatalities increases as the distance from the 
nearest border crossing decreases, where the increased fatalities place a larger cost 
burden on the counties that are closest to the border crossings.  
The first part of Chapter 4 enhances the reported link between entrepreneurship 
and economic growth by performing state-panel causality tests between economic growth 
and two measures of entrepreneurship—sole proprietors and patent activity. Results show 
a one-way causal relationship from entrepreneurship to economic growth. With the 
recognition that entrepreneurial activity is a key factor in economic growth, many local 
governments have begun to enact policies targeted at promoting entrepreneurship. One 
frequently cited strategy for promoting entrepreneurial activity is to attract large amounts 
of venture capital, in the hopes of inducing more entrepreneurial activity. The next 
section of this chapter tests the direction of causality between venture capital and 
entrepreneurial activity and finds that it is the presence of entrepreneurial activity that 
draws venture funding to an area, and not vice versa.  
Thus, the question remains of what policies can create or promote greater levels 
of entrepreneurship. To answer this question, I model the determinants of state-level 
entrepreneurial growth and conclude that, after controlling for various demographic and 
economic influences, the level of economic freedom in a state, measured by a composite 
index of several various state taxes and regulations, is a significant determinant of the 
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growth of entrepreneurship. Thus, my results imply that enacting policies consistent with 
economic freedom, such as low taxes, low regulations, and secure property rights that 
provide a good environment for attracting or developing individual entrepreneurs, are the 
appropriate economic development policies. 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by reviewing the major findings of 
each of the research chapters and highlighting the importance of each. The concluding 





An Efficiency Comparison of City Managers and Elected Mayors 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Historically, the majority of U.S. city governments have adopted either an elected mayor-
council (EMC) form of government or a council-manager (CM) form. Several economists 
and political scientists have attempted to find efficiency differences between these two 
competing forms of city government. The hypothesized difference is based on the theory 
that a professionally trained city manager has an efficiency advantage over a popularly 
elected mayor in administering city taxes and producing local public goods. However, 
past studies that analyze different cities’ common government expenditures have found 
no significant differences in the two forms of government. The analysis of “common” 
governmental expenditures refers to the fact that the studies limited their analysis to only 
expenditures that comprise significant portions of almost all city spending, which 
generally included expenditures on police protection, fire protection, and refuse 
collection. 
 The finding of no difference in efficiency is surprising given the current trend 
toward cities adopting the CM form of government. As reported by the International 
City/County Management Association (ICMA), the CM government is currently the 
fastest growing form of U.S. city government. According to the ICMA, an average of 67 
U.S. cities per year have adopted the CM form of government since 1981, while the EMC 
form of government lost an average of 20 cities per year. The city governments making 
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the transition from the EMC form to the CM form have to receive some kind of benefits 
from the transition, or else, there would be no reason to make the switch. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to use a different methodology to search for 
efficiency differences between the two forms of government in order to provide one 
possible explanation for the recent trend towards adopting the CM form of city 
government. In order to build upon the previous literature’s use of common government 
expenditures, and account for the other services offered by a city government, this 
chapter relies on the theory that local public services, and the taxes to finance them, are 
capitalized into housing prices. This chapter contends that the common expenditures 
alone are not adequate enough to fully capture the differences in the spending patterns of 
the two competing forms of government. Rather, analysis of city taxes and production of 
local public goods will better capture the scope of the cities’ public service capabilities, 
and help reveal efficiency differences in the two forms of government, if they exist.  
House-selling prices for 1991 home sales were analyzed for the six largest 
metropolitan areas in Ohio. Specifically, house-selling prices for homes located in the 
metropolitan areas of Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo, 
(including both central cities and several surrounding cities) were estimated using a log-
linear hedonic technique. Results show that houses within a CM city have a pricing 
premium that can be attributed to the relative efficiency advantage of the CM form of 
government. Furthermore, houses within a metropolitan area, which has a CM central-
city government, have a pricing premium that can be attributed to the relative efficiency 
of the CM form of government. 
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 The set up of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 will further characterize the 
two forms of city government, with emphasis on the position of city manager in the CM 
form, and mayor in the EMC form. Section 2.3 will present the previous city government 
research. Section 2.4 will highlight the current trend towards adopting the CM form of 
government in the United States and Ohio. Section 2.5 will set up the hedonic price 
model to be estimated and describe the data incorporated in the estimation process. 
Section 2.6 will outline the estimation results. Finally, Section 2.7 will present 
concluding remarks on the implications of the estimation results.  
  
2.2 Characteristics of City Managers and Elected Mayors  
The major distinction between the two forms of government is who controls the power to 
make decisions about city budgeting and basic day-to-day city government operations. 
Generally, the city manager in the CM form, or the mayor in the EMC form, controls the 
day-to-day administering of the city operations. Typically, these two city officials have 
different educational backgrounds, occupational experiences, and political motivations, 
which should influence the way city taxes are levied and local public services are 
produced by each form of government. 
The CM government consists of a city council, a city manager, and a ceremonial 
mayor. The city council is comprised of elected officials and is responsible for general 
city policy making. However, the city council hires a professional city manager that 
provides policy advice, conducts the daily city government operations, hires and fires city 
personnel, and is responsible for the city budget preparation. The mayor of the CM 
government is often selected from within the council members or is popularly elected by 
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the city residents, and is reserved for only ceremonial purposes with no regular 
administrative responsibilities.2 
The CM form of government was a product of the progressive government reform 
movement that started in the early 1900s in response to corruption and inefficiencies that 
were becoming apparent in major eastern U.S. cities.3 As stated by White (1927), city 
managers have a deep obligation to conduct the affairs of the city with integrity and 
efficiency, without acting in a partisan manor. Clearly, the movement envisioned 
professional, nonpartisan, political administrators that would efficiently run the day-to-
day operations of the city. Professional city managers are typically hired based on their 
educational background, experience, and administrative ability, without regard to their 
political views.4  
The city manager position was also envisioned as a way to ensure that public 
policies would be designed to promote long-term city growth and development. This can 
be seen in the fact that city managers are not legally limited in the number of years they 
can serve a given city. As long as city mangers appease their city council members, their 
                                                 
2 Svara (1987) noted that the role of a CM mayor has often been overlooked in past 
research, and argued that this practice should not persist. The author used data from 
several interviews with mayors, council members, and city managers to argue that CM 
mayor’s conduct in office can significantly influence how well a CM government 
performs. The author noted that cooperation between the CM mayor and the city manager 
can produce significant improvements in governmental performance. 
3 According to the IMCA, the first recognized city manager position was instituted in 
1908 by Staunton, Virginia, and the first large U.S. city to institute a city manager was 
Dayton, Ohio, in 1914. 
4 According to the ICMA, State of the Profession Survey, 2000, sixty percent of all city 
managers earned a master’s of public or business administration, or other administrative 
master’s degree.  
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terms of city services can be quite prolonged.5 This will allow the city manager to enact 
tax policies and expenditure schemes that promote long-term efficiency in the production 
of local public services. 
 In contrast to the ceremonial mayor in the CM form of government, the mayor in 
the EMC form has most of the political authority. The EMC mayor is popularly elected 
and has the responsibility for day-to-day operations, hiring and firing department heads, 
and preparing and administering the budget. The EMC government has an elected city 
council that performs some legislative dut ies; however, the authoritative mayor usually 
limits the council’s political power. The EMC mayor’s term of service varies in length at 
the discretion of each city’s bylaws (usually two to four years), and the number of terms 
the mayor can serve may be limited according to the practices of the city. 
 Theoretically, the professionally trained city manager should provide efficiency 
gains over a popularly elected mayor. More specifically, the political skills that lead to a 
mayor’s election do not necessarily correspond with administrative abilities. Weingast, 
Shepsle, and Johnson (1981) have shown that politicians consistently overstate the 
benefits of a given project, in order to gain popular support for their programs. The 
altering of the cost-benefit accounting of government projects, drives the political process 
away from efficiency. The inefficient cost-benefit behavior is brought on by the fact that 
politicians are vote maximizers and only care about the issues that are currently relevant 
to their jurisdictions. In this respect, the CM government may prove to be more efficient 
than the EMC form because the city managers are trained in public administration and are 
not directly subject to the voting pressures that lead to the administrative inefficiencies.  
                                                 
5 According to the ICMA, State of the Profession Survey, 2000, the average tenure of a 
city manager is currently 17.4 years. 
 16
Also, the fact that the average city manager’s tenure is quite prolonged shows that 
they are removed from the “short-sighted” political pressures to temporarily appeal to 
voters. The prolonged service to a given city allows the city manager to direct the city 
towards long-term efficiency, growth, and development, which contrasts the political 
motivation of mayors to produce short-term benefits with unclear future costs. Despite 
the hypothesized efficiency advantage of city managers, past studies have not found any 
significant differences between the two forms of government.   
 
2.3 Previous City Government Research 
Booms (1966) analyzes the determinants of per capita city expenditures on police 
protection, fire protection, highways, sanitation, and public health for cities in Ohio and 
Michigan. He shows that there are significant differences in the per capita expenditures of 
CM and EMC cities. Specifically, the CM cities have lower per capita public spending 
levels than EMC cities. This result would support the hypothesis that CM governments 
are relatively more efficient than EMC forms. However, Boom’s findings have not been 
supported by more recent empirical analyses. 
 Deno and Mehay (1987) used a median voter model approach to directly test 
Booms’ (1966) findings. The authors argue that both the mayor of the EMC government 
and the city council of the CM government have strong incentive to offer public goods in 
accordance with the median voter’s wishes. If the elected officials deviate from the 
median position, those politicians face the threat of being replaced by candidates who do 
reflect the preferences of the majority of voters. Since the city council of the CM 
government is in control of hiring and firing the city manager, the city council will put 
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pressure on the manager to enact policies that are in line with the median voter’s 
preferences. This implies that the median voter model should not find significant 
differences in the expenditures of the two government forms.  
Deno and Mehay (1987) use a similar data set as Booms (1966), including 
observations only from Michigan and Ohio, and find no significant expenditure 
differences in the two forms of government. The authors then extend their analysis 
beyond the two states and include 191 randomly selected US cities. The authors again 
find no significant difference in expenditures of the two forms of government.6 The 
authors attribute these results to the idea that, regardless of city management structure, 
both forms of government will have strong incentives to gravitate to the same level of 
public expenditures: the level most preferred by the median voter. 
Modeling city government as a multi-product firm, Hayes and Chang (1990) show 
that there is no relative efficiency gain associated with CM governments. The 
government’s ‘outputs’ are the services provided by the city, and the decision maker’s 
objective function is to minimize costs. The authors analyze three services offered by the 
two forms of city government (police protection, fire protection, and refuse collection) 
and find no difference in relative efficiency. The authors propose that the city manager, 
once hired, might not have a strong incentive to improve the efficiency of the city 
government. Instead, the city manager may only have incentive to please the city council, 
                                                 
6 Deno and Mehay (1987) also tested if the city form of government affected municipal 
wages and compensation levels for all municipal employees, and then more specifically 
for police and fire personnel. The authors concluded that no significant differences could 
be found in the total labor compensation provided by the two forms of government. Other 
studies have analyzed the effects of city government structure on wages and have found 
no conclusive evidence to support differences between the two forms of government; see 
Ehrenberg (1973), Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975), Bartel and Lewin (1981), and 
O’Brien (1992, 1995).  
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which controls the longevity of the manager’s tenure. This would again strengthen the 
link between the voters and the city manager, which would cause the CM production of 
local public goods to correspond closely with the EMC produced local goods. 
Davis and Hayes (1993) construct efficiency measures for 141 Illinois municipal 
police departments based on the costs of producing police protection services and the 
estimated output of police services generated. The authors use the efficiency measures to 
test if police department efficiency is influenced by the presence of a city manager. The 
authors’ findings show that the presence of a city manager has no significant impact on 
the police department efficiency measures. This result is consistent with the existing 
literature that finds no efficiency differences between the two forms of government. 
   
2.4 The Trend Toward City Managers  
Despite the fact that numerous studies have shown that the CM form of government has 
no relative efficiency advantage, it is currently the fastest growing form of government in 
the United States. Table 2.1 shows a comparison of the percent of US and Ohio cities 
with CM and EMC forms of government, for selected years between 1976 and 1999.  
 
Table 2.1 Percent of U.S. and Ohio Cities by Form of Government, 1976-1999 
 
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of omitted forms of government. 
Source: ICMA, The Municipal Year Book, (1976-1999). 
  1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 1999 
U.S. Total        
    Elected Mayor-Council 58% 57% 55% 53% 49% 43% 
    Council-Manager 32% 34% 35% 37% 42% 49% 
Ohio Total        
    Elected Mayor-Council 80% 79% 78% 76% 74% 70% 
    Council-Manager 20% 21% 22% 24% 26% 30% 
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As shown in Table 2.1, the percent of CM cities has been growing since 1976 for 
all U.S. cities and Ohio cities, while the percent of EMC cities has been steadily 
decreasing. Specifically, the EMC form of government lost fifteen percent of the share of 
U.S. cities and lost ten percent of the share of Ohio cities, between 1976 and 1999. 
During the same time period, the CM form of government gained seventeen percent of 
the share of U.S. cities and gained ten percent of the share of Ohio cities. The fact that the 
EMC form of government is losing cities while the CM form of government is gaining 
cities has recently made the CM form the most popular among U.S. cities.  
Again, the aim of this chapter is to use an alternative method of testing for 
efficiency differences in the two forms of government in order to provide some 
explanation of why the trend towards the CM form of government is occurring. The city 
governments making the transition to a CM form have to receive some kind of benefits 
from the transition, or else there would be no reason to make the transition. The benefits 
received may be in the form of efficiency gains brought on by the presence of a 
professional city manager. Such efficiency gains may have gone undetected by earlier 
research of local government structure because of the emphasis on analyzing only a 
limited set of common government expenditures.  
The analysis of common governmental expenditures refers to the fact that the 
studies limited their analysis to only the expenditure categories comprising a significant 
portion of city spending. Booms (1966) ana lyzes per capita city expenditures on police 
protection, fire protection, highways, sanitation, and public health. Deno and Mehay 
(1987) analyze expenditures on police protection, fire protection, sewerage, highways, 
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interest on local debt, and general administration. Hayes and Chang (1990) analyze 
expenditures on three city government services: police protection, fire protection, and 
garbage collection. Finally, Davis and Hayes (1993) analyze the efficiency of local police 
departments.  
This analysis of a limited array of expenditures may not be adequate to fully 
capture the differences in the spending patterns of the two forms of government. More 
specifically, by analyzing only a limited array of expenditure types, previous studies may 
have missed any relative efficiency differences in the two forms of government. The 
efficiency differences could show up as an increase in the quality of the common city 
public services. Also, as acknowledged by Hayes and Chang (1990), the efficiency 
differences may be captured in smaller city budget expenditure areas. Ultimately, the 
total value of the public services offered by each city needs to be analyzed, along with the 
taxes that are used to finance the public services. Following this logic, the sum total 
difference between the two forms of government should be reflected in the house-selling 
prices of those areas. In other words, the value of the local public goods, the taxes used to 
finance those goods, and any efficiency advantages to the CM form of government 
should be capitalized into the house-selling prices.  
In summary, it is variation in the value and efficiency of the public services 
produced, rather than simply the expenditures on those services, that may show the 
differences in the two forms of city government. Duffy-Deno and Dalenberg (1990) 
provides evidence contrary to the popular finding that city form of government does not 
matter, by analyzing 26 cities’ capital usage rates employed to produce local public 
goods. Although the authors do not directly test for efficiency differences, they show that 
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EMC cities consistently have significantly higher capital- input usage rates than CM 
cities.  
Duffy-Deno and Dalenberg (1990) argue that the institutional differences in the 
two forms of government cause each to take different views on the role for capital inputs. 
Specifically, professional city managers may view capital and labor as simply inputs in a 
production function, while mayors may intend to use the inputs as political assets. Thus, 
the higher EMC capital- input usage rates are produced by the incentive of mayors to 
undertake more highly visible public works projects in order to influence public opinion, 
which may be undertaken in disregard to efficiency accounting criteria. Ultimately, the 
authors’ findings suggest that the manner in which public goods are produced by the two 
forms of government does matter, and this may have relative efficiency implications. 
Again, the task of analyzing the manner of producing local public goods will be carried 
out through the analysis of house-selling prices, which reflect the capitalized value of 
both the local public goods and the city government taxes that were used to finance the 
public goods. 
 
2.5 Hedonic Price Model and Data Description 
Generally, the hedonic price model estimates house-selling prices as a function of several 
characteristics. More specifically, house-selling prices are dependent on structural house 
characteristics, city characteristics, and governmental influences. The hedonic price 
model contends that a house-selling price can be estimated as a function of the structural 
characteristics of the house, city characteristics of the residence location, and the form of 
 22
city government. The selling price in the hedonic model framework, adapted to include 
the city form of government influence, generally takes the following form: 
PH = PH (S, C, G)  (2.1) 
where PH is the house-selling price, S is a vector of structural house characteristics (such 
as house size, lot size, and number of bathrooms), C is a vector of city characteristics 
(such as property taxes and expenditures on local public goods), and G is the city form of 
government. 
The focus of this chapter is on the influence that a city’s form of government has 
on selling prices of homes in that jurisdiction. It is hypothesized that the differences in 
tax policies and variations in the value of local public services may reveal efficiency 
differences between the two forms of city government, which the hedonic price 
estimation technique lends itself to directly testing. The hedonic price model analysis 
imbeds the theory that the value of local public services, and the taxes to finance them, 
are capitalized into house-selling prices.7  
More specifically, higher property taxes will lead to lower house-selling prices, 
while improvements in the value (quality or quantity) of local public services offered by a 
city government will lead to higher house-selling prices. Therefore, the net effect of the 
two local government functions is what is actually being capitalized into the house-
selling prices.8 In other words, the selling prices pick up the influence of the value of the 
public services provided, net of the cost of the city property taxes used to finance them.  
                                                 
7 For relevant literature on the capitalization of local public services into house values 
refer to Oates (1969), Rosen and Fullerton (1977), Brueckner (1979), or Yinger (1982). 
8 It should be noted that state government influences are also capitalized into house-
selling prices; however, these influences are held constant because all the home sales are 
from cities within Ohio. 
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If the value of the public services outweighs the cost of the taxes, then the net 
effect of the city government is positive, which shows the city government is operating 
efficiently.9 A positive net effect would result in higher house-selling prices, which 
shows that more efficient city governments will have higher selling prices, ceteris 
paribus. Following this logic, it is hypothesized that professional city managers will 
conduct the city government affairs more efficiently relative to the EMC form of 
government. City managers can achieve this relative efficiency advantage by increasing 
the value of their public goods, or by decreasing the imposed costs of taxation. For 
example, city managers may produce more valuable public services given the same costs 
of taxation of the EMC government. Also, city managers may impose less costs of 
taxation to produce the same value of public goods as the EMC government.10 Regardless 
of the method of producing the CM efficiency gains, if they exist, they will show up as a 
pricing premium in the estimation of the house-selling prices.     
 The house prices that are estimated were from houses sold in 1991 in the six 
largest Ohio metropolitan areas, including central cities and several surrounding cities. 
The six central cities include Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and 
Toledo.11 Analysis of Ohio house sales is beneficial in order to directly compare to earlier 
                                                 
9 Likewise, if the costs of taxation outweigh the value of the public services, then the net 
effect of the government influence would be negative, implying that the government is 
operating inefficiently.  
10 It also is feasible for city managers to produce more valuable public goods while, at the 
same time, decreasing the imposed cost of taxation, which again would result in a more 
significant and positive net effect of the city government.  
11 The surrounding cities that were included in this study, based on data availability, were 
the following: Barberton, Brunswick, Cuyahoga Falls, Elyria, Fairborn, Fairfield, 
Gahanna, Hamilton, Kent, Lorain, Mentor, Middletown, North Olmsted, Reynoldsburg, 
Stow, and Westerville. These sixteen cities, along with the six central cities listed above, 
were the 22 cities included in the full sample analysis that follows. 
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studies such as Booms (1966) and Deno and Mehay (1987), which both studied the 
expenditures of Ohio city governments. Table 2.2 shows the data distribution among the 
six Ohio metropolitan areas and the two forms of city government classified by central 
city.  
 
Table 2.2 Data Distribution Among Ohio Cities and Forms of Government 
 
 
Sources: (a) ICMA, The Municipal Year Book, (1991); (b) Amerestate, Pace Net Data 
Set, (1991). 
 
The six central cities are spilt fifty-fifty between the two forms of city 
government; Cincinnati, Dayton, and Toledo had the CM form of government, while 
Akron, Cleveland, and Columbus had the EMC form. The house sales are somewhat 
evenly distributed between the two forms of government, with roughly 40 percent of the 
house sales occurring in CM cities and 60 percent occurring in EMC cities. This even 
distribution of house sales across the two forms of government is beneficial in testing for 
differences in the two forms of government. 
   The house-selling prices and house structural characteristics are based on the 
data set used by Haurin and Brasington (1996, 2001) and Brasington (1999, 2000, 2001). 
The data set includes only single-family detached dwellings. Also, any houses were 
eliminated that had a lot size greater than two acres to avoid inclusion of farming 
Metropolitan Central City Form of Number of Observed Percent of Total Observed 
Area Government (a) House Sales (b) House Sales 
Akron Elected Mayor-Council 4,078 11% 
Cincinnati Council-Manager 6,520 17% 
Cleveland Elected Mayor-Council 11,866 32% 
Columbus Elected Mayor-Council 6,272 17% 
Dayton Council-Manager 5,743 15% 
Toledo Council-Manager 2,962 8% 
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locations. Next, all houses were eliminated that sold for more than $400,000 or less than 
$10,000. Houses selling for more than $400,000 were deemed unrepresentative, and 
houses selling under $10,000 were suspected of being gifts between family members or 
generally uninhabitable. The authors also deflated the house-selling prices according to 
constructed metro area deflators.  
There are two different samples of house sales that are estimated. First, a full 
sample of house sales occurring in 22 Ohio cities, as described earlier, is estimated. There 
were 37,441 home sales used in the estimation of the full sample, and the mean deflated 
house-selling price was $69,312. Second, a set of regressions was run that only included 
home sales in the six central cities. This analysis serves to check the robustness of the 
findings from the full sample estimation process. There were 31,274 home sales used in 
the estimation of the central-city sample, and the mean deflated house-selling price was 
$69,243. 
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics, definitions, and sources for the dependent 
and independent variables used in the estimation process. The structural house 
characteristics follow closely what has been used in previous hedonic price model 
analysis. There are dummy variables included in the estimation process to account for the 
CM form of government. By testing if the CM dummy variables are significant after 
controlling for city-specific influences such as public expenditures and taxes, the current 
study can provide evidence on whether the influence of the CM form of government is 
more highly valued in the housing market. Any such capitalization will capture the 
difference between the two forms of government, and therefore, reflect the value that 
residents place on the relative efficiency of the CM form of government. 
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics, Definitions, and Sources for Variables 
Variable Name (definition) (source) Mean St. Dev. 
Dependent Variables   
House-Selling Price (Deflated house transaction amount, full sample, 1991) (a) 69,312 41,572 
   Log Price (Natural log of the deflated house transaction amount, full sample, 1991) 10.97 0.61 
House-Selling Price (Deflated house transaction amount, only MSA central cities, 1991) (a) 69,243 43,137 
   Log Price (Natural log of the deflated house transaction amount, only MSA central cities, 1991) 10.96 0.63 
   
Independent Variables   
Council-Manager City (Dummy =1 if CM form of city government in 1991) (b) 0.44 0.49 
Council-Manager Central City (Dummy =1 if CM form of MSA central-city government in 1991) (b) 0.41 0.49 
Property Tax Rate (Residential property tax millage rate net of tax reduction factors, 1991) (c) 51.89 6.48 
Total Government Expenditures (City government expenditure in ten millions of dollars, 1990-1991) (d) 36,6714 20,1875 
Civilian Unemployment Rate (Civilian labor force percent unemployed, 1991) (d) 7.29 1.93 
Growth of Housing Units (Percent change of housing units from 1980-1990) (d) 2.41 12.20 
9th-Grade Proficiency (Average passage rate of the State of Ohio 9th-grade proficiency test, 1990-1991) (e) 33.86 18.49 
Burglary and Larceny Crime rate (Burglary and larceny crimes per thousand population, 1991) (f) 7.77 23.55 
Air Conditioning (Dummy =1 if the house has central air-conditioning) (a) 0.34 0.47 
Fireplace (Dummy =1 if the house has a fireplace) (a) 0.37 0.48 
Lot Size (Size of the lot in thousands of square feet) (a) 9.75 8.34 
Age (Age of the house in years) (a) 45.16 23.98 
House Size (Size of the house in thousands of square feet) (a) 1.43 0.49 
Garage Size (Size of the garage in thousands of square feet) (a) 0.32 0.19 
Full Bathrooms (Number of full bathrooms) (a) 1.27 0.48 
Part Bathrooms (Number of partial bathrooms) (a) 0.31 0.48 
Unenclosed Porches (Number of unenclosed porches) (a) 0.79 0.74 
Enclosed Porches (Number of enclosed porches) (a) 0.16 0.39 
Patio (Dummy =1 if the house has a patio) (a) 0.20 0.40 
Deck (Dummy =1 if the house has a deck) (a) 0.10 0.30 
Pool (Dummy =1 if the house has a pool) (a) 0.01 0.11 
 
Note: The mean and standard deviation values reported for the independent variables are 
for the full sample of Ohio cities. 
 
Sources: (a) Amerestate, Pace Net Data Set, (1991);  (b) ICMA, The Municipal Year 
Book, (1991); (c) Ohio Department of Taxation, Property Tax Millage Rates, (1991); (d) 
U.S. Census, County and City Data Book, (1994); (e) Ohio Department of Education, 
Ohio 9th-Grade Proficiency Test Passage Rates (1990-1991); (f) Office of Criminal 
Justice Services, State of Ohio, Crime by County 1993, (1994). 
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Specifically, two different CM dummy variables were included in the full sample 
estimation to capture both city and central city effects.12 The CM city government 
dummy variable is equal to one if the house is located in a city with the CM form of 
government and is used to test the relative efficiency advantage of being in a CM city 
over an EMC city. The CM city dummy variable will be significant and positive if 
professional city managers offer local public services that are valued more than those 
offered by EMC mayors, net of the tax burden for each form of government.  
The performance of the central-city government should not only influence the 
selling prices of homes located in its borders, but also the selling prices of the homes 
located within the metropolitan area. This comes from the fact that many residents of the 
surrounding cities work or recreate in, or travel through, the central city. The CM central-
city government dummy variable is equal to one if the house is located in a metropolitan 
area where the central city has a CM form of government, and this variable is used to test 
the relative efficiency advantage of being in a CM-run metropolitan area over an EMC-
run metropolitan area. Again, the CM central-city dummy variable will be significant and 
positive if professional city managers offer local public services that are valued more 
than those offered by EMC mayors, net of the tax burden for each form of government.  
 City-specific measures of property tax rates, total government expenditures, 
unemployment rates, and housing unit growth are used to control for the city-specific 
influences affecting house-selling prices in each regression. The property tax rate and the 
total government expenditure are included to directly control for the finances of each city. 
                                                 
12 Only one city form of government dummy variable is included in the estimation of the 
central-city sample of house-selling prices, which is equal to one if the central-city has a 
CM form of government.  
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General capitalization theory states that higher property tax rates result in lower house-
selling prices, while greater public expenditures results in higher house-selling prices. 
This generalization comes from the notion that the property taxes are a cost imposed on 
the city residents, while the public goods, produced by government expenditures, are a 
benefit received by the residents. Thus, the property tax rate is expected to carry a 
negative sign and the total government expenditure is expected to carry a positive sign.  
 The city unemployment rate and housing growth variables are included to better 
characterize each city’s economic activity. The city unemployment rates are included to 
directly control for the level of job availability (capacity) in each city. Cities with lower 
unemployment rates, or higher job availability, are relatively more attractive to live and 
work in than those cities experiencing high levels of unemployment, or lower job 
availability. Thus, the unemployment rate is expected to carry a negative sign showing 
that more job availability (low unemployment) exerts a positive influence on house-
selling prices. The growth of housing units is included to directly control for the supply 
of housing market in each city. The housing growth rate is expected to carry a negative 
sign because increased levels of supply are typically followed by decreased prices. 
 Two outcome variables, measuring school quality and police protection, are 
included in various regressions to serve as robustness checks to the influence that CM 
governments have on the quality of public goods.13 As supported by the findings of 
Brasington (1999), the housing market consistently values proficiency test scores as a 
                                                 
13 Because of the limited degrees of freedom, especially when estimating the central-city 
only sample, the measures of school quality and police protection are reported at the 
school-district level. The smaller and more defined measurement area will better 
characterize the specific-area influences of schooling and policing that affect each house 
value, while still serving the purpose of controlling for such influences. 
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measure of school quality. Therefore, the average passage rate of the State of Ohio 9th-
grade proficiency test is included in selected regressions to control for school quality, and 
is expected to carry a positive sign, showing that increased school quality positively 
influences house-selling prices. In order to control for the level of police protection, a 
burglary and larceny crime rate, measured per one thousand residents, is included in 
selected regressions. Burglary and Larceny crimes are chosen because they are a direct 
measure of the threat imposed on the protection of the private property of homeowners. 
The burglary- larceny crime rate should be negatively correlated with house-selling 
prices, showing that high crime areas have lower house-selling prices. 
 
2.6 Estimation Results 
The log- linear hedonic price function was estimated using least squares regression 
analysis. The hedonic price function relates the house-selling price to the structural 
characteristics of the home, the city characteristics of the residence location, and the form 
of the city government. The econometric model can be written as follows: 
ln PHi = β0 + ∑
m=1
M
 βm Sm,i    +  ∑
n=1
N
 βn Cn,i    + βp Gp,i + εI  (2.2) 
where, ln PHi is the natural log of the selling price for house i, Sm,i is the measure of the 
mth structural variable for house i, Cn,i is the measure of the nth city characteristic for the 
residence location of house i, and Gp,i is the city form of government for the residence 




Table 2.4 Log-Linear Hedonic Estimates of Ohio Metro House-Selling Prices (Full Sample) 
37,441 Observed House Sales in 1991(Absolute value of t-stats) 
  [a] [b] [c] [d] 
 Council-Manager City Government 0.0222* 0.0280** 0.0344** 0.0403*** 
 (1.67) (2.12) (2.46) (2.90) 
 Council-Manager Central-City Government 0.0493*** 0.0438*** 0.0436*** 0.0380*** 
  (3.58) (3.19) (3.02) (2.65) 
 Property Tax Rate -0.0033*** -0.0032*** -0.0063*** -0.0061*** 
  (7.60) (7.30) (13.76) (13.48) 
 Total Government Expenditures ($10,000,000) 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 
  (15.70) (15.78) (13.03) (13.11) 
 Civilian Unemployment Rate -0.0271*** -0.0268*** -0.0421*** -0.0418*** 
 (15.10) (14.96) (22.62) (22.49) 
 Growth of Housing Units -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** 
 (6.21) (6.65) (7.44) (7.88) 
 9th-Grade Proficiency 0.0077*** 0.0077***    
 (60.49) (60.49)    
 Burglary and Larceny Crime Rate -0.0003***  -0.0003***   
  (3.98)   (3.85)   
 Air Conditioning 0.1037*** 0.1037*** 0.1196*** 0.1196*** 
  (20.79) (20.79) (22.93) (22.92) 
 Fireplace 0.1285*** 0.1289*** 0.1510*** 0.1514*** 
  (26.78) (26.87) (30.14) (30.22) 
 Lot Size (1,000 sq. ft.) 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 0.0191*** 0.0192*** 
  (17.34) (17.37) (29.23) (29.26) 
 Lot Size Squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
  (11.29) (11.35) (18.48) (18.53) 
 Age 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 
  (7.25) (7.20) (3.93) (3.88) 
 Age Squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
  (26.43) (26.37) (25.10) (25.04) 
 House Size (1,000 sq. ft.) 0.4897*** 0.4892*** 0.4960*** 0.4955*** 
  (25.08) (25.05) (24.24) (24.21) 
 House Size Squared -0.0430*** -0.0429*** -0.0376*** -0.0374*** 
  (7.89) (7.86) (6.58) (6.55) 
 Garage Size (1,000 sq. ft.) 0.7161*** 0.7170*** 0.7746*** 0.7756*** 
  (27.77) (27.80) (28.69) (28.73) 
 Garage Size Squared -0.6662*** -0.6671*** -0.7259*** -0.7268*** 
  (17.04) (17.06) (17.72) (17.74) 
 Full Bathrooms  0.0457*** 0.0460*** 0.0623*** 0.0626*** 
  (8.18) (8.23) (10.65) (10.70) 
 Part Bathrooms  0.0749*** 0.0752*** 0.0906*** 0.0909*** 
  (15.39) (15.47) (17.80) (17.87) 
 Unenclosed Porches  -0.0039 -0.0040 -0.0081** -0.0082** 
  (1.20) (1.21) (2.36) (2.38) 
 Enclosed Porches  0.0045 0.0045 0.0101* 0.0102* 
  (0.81) (0.82) (1.74) (1.74) 
 Patio 0.0262*** 0.0253*** 0.0256*** 0.0246*** 
  (4.80) (4.64) (4.48) (4.32) 
 Deck 0.0872*** 0.0874*** 0.1032*** 0.1034*** 
  (12.72) (12.74) (14.38) (14.40) 
 Pool 0.0399** 0.0394** 0.0363** 0.0358** 
 (2.35) (2.32) (2.04) (2.01) 
 Constant 9.6786*** 9.6811*** 9.8154*** 9.8179*** 
  (296.58) (296.66) (287.76) (287.83) 
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.61 
Significance levels are represented by:  *** 1%,  ** 5%,  * 10% 
Quarter of sale dummy variables were included in each regression, and are available upon 
request to the author. 
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The log- linear hedonic price estimates for the full sample of Ohio cities are 
presented in Table 2.4. The house structural characteristics all have signs and significant 
levels that are generally supported in the hedonic house price literature. The city 
characteristics (property tax rate, total government expenditures, unemployment rate, and 
housing growth) all had the expected signs and remained significant throughout the four 
specifications. Also, the outcome variables (school quality and police protection) had the 
expected signs and remained significant in the regressions that they were included in. 
The focus of this chapter is primarily on the differences in the two major forms of 
city government. Thus the variables that are of particular interest to test for relative 
efficiency differences are the two CM dummy variables. These two dummy variables are 
designed to test the effect that CM governments have on house-selling prices relative to 
the influence of EMC governments. After controlling for city taxes and expenditures, 
along with other city characteristics and outcome variables, the two CM dummy variables 
remain significant and positive throughout the four regression specifications.  
The finding of positive and significant coefficient estimates for the CM dummy 
variables imply that there is a positive net effect of the CM form of government relative 
to the EMC form. In other words, professional city managers offer local public services 
that are valued more than EMC mayors, net of the tax burden of each form of 
government. The results support the hypothesis that the presence of a city manager 
produces a relative efficiency advantage for the CM form of government over the EMC 
form. In other words, adopting a CM form of government increases the house-selling 
price of homes located in CM cities, or CM-run metropolitan areas, relative to those 
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located in EMC areas, which can be attributed to the efficiency gains produced by the 
professional city manager.  
In order to serve as a final robustness check the same regressions were run using 
only data from the six central cities. Also, in comparing the magnitude and significance 
of the two CM dummy variables, both city and central city, the metropolitan area CM 
dummy seems to exert a stronger influence on the house-selling prices. Implying that the 
central-city government form may matter more than the form of government of the 
surrounding cities. Likewise, there may be a stronger CM influence on the houses located 
within the central cities. Estimating just the house-selling prices occurring in central 
cities will reveal if the CM effect on house-selling prices is more or less pronounced in 
the central cities of the metropolitan areas.  
The estimation results for the central-city sample of home sales are reported in 
Table 2.5. The only structural difference is that only one CM dummy was needed to test 
for relative city form of government efficiency differences. The results do not differ 
substantially from those reported for the full sample estimation. All variables retained 
their expected signs and most retained significance throughout all four regressions. The 
one striking difference is the coefficient estimate on the CM dummy variable, which 
appears significantly larger than the estimates from the full sample. This reveals that the 






Table 2.5: Log-Linear Hedonic Estimates of Ohio Metro House-Selling Prices (Central Cities) 
31,274 Observed House Sales in 1991 (Absolute value of t-stats) 
  [a] [b] [c] [d] 
 Council-Manager City Government 0.1491*** 0.1501*** 0.1712*** 0.1722*** 
  (9.58) (9.65) (10.52) (10.59) 
  Property Tax Rate -0.0061* -0.0064* -0.0124*** -0.0127*** 
  (1.62) (1.70) (3.16) (3.25) 
 Total Government Expenditures ($10,000,000) 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 
  (21.57) (21.55) (25.04) (25.02) 
 Civilian Unemployment Rate -0.0265*** -0.0272*** -0.0386*** -0.0393*** 
 (5.26) (5.42) (7.34) (7.50) 
 Growth of Housing Units -0.0052*** -0.0054*** -0.0092*** -0.0094*** 
 (5.35) (5.56) (9.09) (9.31) 
 9th-Grade Proficiency 0.0075*** 0.0075***    
 (54.07) (54.07)    
 Burglary and Larceny Crime Rate -0.0002*  -0.0002   
  (1.66)   (1.59)   
 Air Conditioning 0.1069*** 0.1070*** 0.1246*** 0.1247*** 
  (19.06) (19.07) (21.28) (21.29) 
 Fireplace 0.1400*** 0.1402*** 0.1660*** 0.1662*** 
  (26.14) (26.18) (29.76) (29.80) 
 Lot Size (1,000 sq. ft.) 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 
  (13.68) (13.65) (24.57) (24.54) 
 Lot Size Squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
  (8.80) (8.80) (15.65) (15.65) 
 Age 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0028*** 0.0027*** 
  (10.59) (10.55) (6.76) (6.72) 
 Age Squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
  (27.54) (27.50) (25.84) (25.81) 
 House Size (1,000 sq. ft.) 0.4839*** 0.4837*** 0.5023*** 0.5021*** 
  (22.51) (22.50) (22.34) (22.34) 
 House Size Squared -0.0388*** -0.0387*** -0.0369*** -0.0368*** 
  (6.49) (6.48) (5.90) (5.89) 
 Garage Size (1,000 sq. ft.) 0.7244*** 0.7249*** 0.7658*** 0.7663*** 
  (24.76) (24.77) (25.04) (25.05) 
 Garage Size Squared -0.6574*** -0.6580*** -0.6982*** -0.6988*** 
  (14.90) (14.91) (15.13) (15.15) 
 Full Bathrooms  0.0549*** 0.0551*** 0.0737*** 0.0739*** 
  (8.72) (8.77) (11.22) (11.26) 
 Part Bathrooms  0.0834*** 0.0837*** 0.1014*** 0.1016*** 
  (15.28) (15.33) (17.79) (17.84) 
 Unenclosed Porches  -0.0059 -0.0058 -0.0063* -0.0062* 
  (1.59) (1.58) (1.62) (1.62) 
 Enclosed Porches  0.0046 0.0046 0.0101 0.0101 
  (0.75) (0.74) (1.56) (1.56) 
 Patio 0.0248*** 0.0245*** 0.0303*** 0.0301*** 
  (3.82) (3.79) (4.47) (4.44) 
 Deck 0.0914*** 0.0915*** 0.1090*** 0.1091*** 
  (11.69) (11.69) (13.33) (13.34) 
 Pool 0.0279 0.0274 0.0235 0.0230 
  (1.43) (1.41) (1.15) (1.13) 
 Constant 9.9627*** 9.9835*** 10.4964*** 10.5172*** 
  (43.16) (43.31) (43.52) (43.67) 
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.61 
 
Significance levels are represented by:  *** 1%,  ** 5%,  * 10% 
Quarter of sale dummy variables were included in each regression, and are available upon 
request to the author.
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The percent effect of the CM government’s influence on house-selling prices 
cannot be directly interpreted by the coefficient estimates appearing in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
because of the semi- logarithmic nature of the hedonic regression technique. Following 
the approach of Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the percentage effect that the CM form 
has on house-selling prices can be calculated as follows: 
α = [exp(β)  - 1] * 100   (2.3) 
where, α is the percent effect of the CM form, and β  is the coefficient estimate of the 
council-manager dummy variable. Calculations of the percentage effects were performed 
for the four regression specifications, for both the full and central city samples, and are 
presented in Table 2.6.  
 
Table 2.6 Percent Effect and Marginal Implicit Price  
of the Council-Manager Form of Government 
 
 [a] [b] [c] [d] 
Full Sample of Ohio Cities    PH
_
  = $69,312      
   Council-Manager City Government      
      Percent Effect (α) 2.24% 2.84% 3.50% 4.11% 
      Implicit Price (ρ) $1,553 $1,968 $2,426 $2,849 
   Council-Manager Central City Government      
      Percent Effect (α) 5.05% 4.48% 4.46% 3.87% 
      Implicit Price (ρ) $3,500 $3,105 $3,091 $2,682 
   Council Manager City and Central City 
Government      
      Percent Effect (α) 7.41% 7.44% 8.11% 8.14% 
      Implicit Price (ρ) $5,136 $5,157 $5,621 $5,642 
         
Only Ohio Central Cities    PH
_
  = $69,243      
   Council-Manager City Government      
      Percent Effect (α) 16.08% 16.20% 18.67% 18.79% 
      Implicit Price (ρ) $11,134 $11,217 $12,928 $13,011 
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 Looking at the calculated percent effects for the full sample of Ohio cities shows 
that the CM central-city government form does exert a stronger impact on house-selling 
prices then the CM city government in three of the four regressions. The CM central-city 
government impact ranges from a low of 3.87% in specification [d] to a high of 5.05% in 
specification [a]. While, the CM city government impact ranges from a low of 2.24% in 
specification [a] to a high of 4.11% in specification [d]. These two dummy variables 
capture the separate effects of (i) a house being located in a CM city relative to an EMC 
city, and (ii) a house being located in a CM-run metropolitan area relative to an EMC-run 
metropolitan area. However, they do not capture the combined effect of being in a CM 
city that is located in a CM-run metropolitan area. In order to capture the combined 
impact, the two coefficient estimates were combined and then used to calculate the 
percent effect (also presented in Table 2.6).14   The combined effect of a house located in 
a CM city and CM-run metropolitan area ranged from a low of 7.41% in specification [a] 
to a high of 8.14% in specification [d]. 
Looking at the calculated percent effects for the sample of Ohio central cities 
shows that the CM city government form does exert a strong impact on house-selling 
prices. The percent effects ranged from a low of 16.08% in specification [a] to a high of 
18.79% in specification [d]. Again, these percent effects are the impact of the CM form 
of government relative to the EMC form, after controlling for several city-specific 
influences and outcome variables tha t have traditionally been shown to affect house-
selling prices. The fact that the percent affects are positive, significant, and quite large 
                                                 
14 To get the combined percent effect the fo llowing calculation was used:  
α = [exp(β1 + β2)  - 1] * 100, where β1 is the coefficient estimate of the CM city dummy, 
and β2 is the coefficient estimate of the CM central-city dummy. 
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shows that the city form of government does matter. Specifically, CM governments 
outperform EMC governments, which results in a significant pricing premium for houses 
located in those areas. 
 The calculated percentage effects were used to calculate the marginal implicit 
price (pricing premium) of adopting a CM form of government.15 Calculations of the 
marginal implicit price of the CM government, evaluated at the mean house-selling price, 
are produced using the following formula and are also presented in Table 2.6: 
ρ = α . PH
_
   (2.4) 
where, ρ is the marginal implicit price of the CM government, and PH
_
  is the mean house-
selling price of the sample.  
The marginal implicit price of the CM government is essentially the pricing 
premium that home owners would be willing to pay to live in a house located in a CM 
city, or CM-run metropolitan area, relative to living in the same house in a EMC area. 
The implicit prices from the full sample of Ohio cities show that residents would, on 
average, pay about $2,000 more to own a house in a CM city and about $3,000 more to 
own a house in a CM-run metropolitan area, relative to owning a house in a EMC area. 
Also, the results show that residents would, on average, pay over $5,000 to own a house 
in a CM city located in a CM-run metropolitan area. When considering the central-city 
sample of house sales, results show that central-city residents would, on average, pay 
around $12,000 to own a house in a CM central-city relative to an EMC central-city. 
                                                 
15 In order for the calculated marginal implicit prices to reveal true implicit prices of each 
attribute, the assumption that individual preferences are weakly separable in housing and 
its attributes has to be made. More specifically, this assumption makes the demands for 
the various attributes independent of the prices of the other goods. 
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Again, the pricing premiums can be attributed to the fact that professional city managers 
offer a superior basket of local public goods relative to EMC mayors, net of the tax 
burden created to finance the production of the local public goods.   
   
2.7 Conclusion 
The majority of U.S. city governments have adopted either an EMC form of government 
or a CM form. Several studies have attempted to find efficiency differences between the 
two competing forms of city government, where the hypothesized difference is based on 
the theory that a professional city manager has an efficiency advantage over a popularly 
elected mayor in the production of local public goods. However, past studies have shown 
no significant differences in the two forms of city government, which is surprising given 
the current trend of U.S. cities adopting the CM form of government.  
 This chapter used an alternative method of testing for city government efficiency 
differences and showed that efficiency differences do exist between the two forms of 
government. This finding provides some insight into the growing trend towards adopting 
the CM form of city government. More specifically, to build upon the use of common 
government expenditures and account for the total value of public services offered by a 
city government, the alternative method relies on the theory that local public services and 
taxes are capitalized into housing prices. It is hypothesized that analysis of all the public 
goods and services offered by a locality will better capture the scope of the cities 
expenditures, and help reveal differences in the two forms of government. Where, if the 
efficiency advantages exist, they will show up in a pricing premium. Results show that 
houses within a CM city, or CM-run metropolitan area, have a significant pricing 
 38
premium that can solely be attributed to the relative efficiency of the CM form of 
government over the EMC form. 
 These results contribute to the literature in that they are the first results since 
Booms (1966) that point to significant efficiency differences in the two forms of city 
government. Booms (1966) findings are supported in the fact that the CM form of 
government has a relative efficiency advantage over the EMC form. The efficiency 
advantage can also be used to explain the current U.S. trend towards adopting the CM 
form of city government. The cities making the transition to the CM form of government 
have to receive some benefits from the change, and the benefits may come in the form of 
efficiency gains. Finally, the alternative methodology employed to show the CM 
government’s relative efficiency advantage sheds some doubt on the use of common 
government expenditures to test for differences in city forms of government. The results 
point to the fact that variations in the total value of the public services produced, and the 
efficiency of the manner in which they were produced, may be better suited to reveal 








“I would say 75 percent (go over the Detroit bridge drunk). There’s a lot. To be 
honest with you, I don’t even think half of those (kids) are even of age. We just 
hope they make it across the bridge without killing someone else. Once they make 
it over, they’re Detroit’s problem.” 
~Canadian Customs Official 
In “The Bridge to Adulthood,” Michigan State University: State News. 
 
One of the most serious consequences of mixing alcohol consumption and driving is 
motor-vehicle fatalities. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
found that 38 percent of all U.S. traffic fatalities in 1999 were alcohol related.16 In that 
same year, the NHTSA found that 40 percent of all traffic fatalities occurring in 
Michigan were alcohol related. Alcohol-related motor-vehicle accidents impose 
substantial costs on society. The Public Services Research Institute estimated that, in 
1998, alcohol-related crashes in the U.S. cost the public more than $110 billion and 
alcohol-related crashes in Michigan cost $3.7 billion. 17  
Economists and social scientists have analyzed the effect that different state 
alcohol policies have on the deterrence of drinking and driving, and thus, the occurrence 
of alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities. These studies have generally examined the 
                                                 
16 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration considers an accident to be 
alcohol related if at least one driver had a blood-alcohol content (BAC) level of 0.01 or 
above. The data presented in this paragraph can be found in the following references: the 
NHTSA data is from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Traffic Safety Facts 1999; 
and the cost data is from Jensen, Miller, and Covington (1999). 
17 According to Jensen, Miller, and Covington (1999) the only U.S. states that 
experienced higher alcohol-related crash costs than Michigan in 1998 were California 
($11.0 billion), Texas ($10.5 billion), Florida ($6.6 billion), and Pennsylvania ($4.0 
billion). 
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effects of changes in state minimum drinking age laws, alcohol taxes, and other 
legislation aimed at drunk drivers. One area that has not been examined is the effect that 
international border crossings, connecting nations with different drinking ages, have on 
motor-vehicle fatalities in the areas around the border crossings. 
In the United States, individual state drinking age laws are now uniformly set at 
twenty-one; however many states share borders with Canada or Mexico, where drinking 
age laws are lower. For example, Michigan’s current legal drinking age is twenty-one, 
while Ontario, Canada’s minimum drinking age is nineteen. In this chapter I hypothesize 
that, because of the difference in the legal drinking age, many nineteen and twenty-year-
old drivers will cross the Michigan-Ontario border to obtain and consume alcohol. 
Accordingly, the presence of the border crossings should increase alcohol consumption, 
and the traffic fatalities that come along with it, among individuals aged nineteen and 
twenty. 
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of the difference in Michigan and Ontario 
minimum drink ing age laws on the occurrence of motor-vehicle fatalities in the Michigan 
counties that are nearer to the international border crossings.18 I explore the impact that 
the Michigan-Ontario border crossings have on motor-vehicle fatalities for all-age drivers 
and, more specifically, for drivers aged nineteen and twenty. My results show that the 
closer the county is to a border crossing, the higher motor-vehicle fatalities for all-aged 
drivers and for drivers aged nineteen and twenty it will have.  
                                                 
18 The aim of this chapter is not to make judgments over which minimum drinking age 
law is more appropriate. Rather I aim to analyze and quantify the impact of the border 
crossings, given the fact that two different minimum drinking age laws exist. 
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The border crossing impact is then quantified in terms of the costs from lives lost 
that are imposed on the counties nearer to the border crossing. The results show that the 
three border crossing counties, on average, have a cost burden beyond the average 
Michigan county, which can be attributed to the increased alcohol-related motor-vehicle 
fatalities produced by the international border crossings. More specifically, the border-
crossing counties will face a cost burden above the average Michigan county’s costs that 
is roughly $166.5 million more for motor-vehicle fatalities of all-aged drivers and $11.1 
million more for fatalities of nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers; and these additional 
costs are strictly because of the presence of the border crossings. One policy implication 
that comes from the costs imposed on the border crossing counties, is that the border 
crossing patrols need to devote more resources to preventing alcohol- impaired border 
crossing traffic. 
The set up of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 will present the relevant 
alcohol policy research literature. Section 3.3 will briefly characterize the Michigan-
Ontario border crossings and detail the measure of distance. Section 3.4 will set up the 
count model used to estimate the determinants of Michigan motor-vehicle fatalities and 
describe the data incorporated in the estimation process. Section 3.5 will outline the 
estimation results. Finally, Section 3.6 will present possible policy implications and 
concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Alcohol Policy Research  
Previous studies of U.S. alcohol policies have mainly been concerned with analyzing the 
differences in state policies and their resulting affects on motor-vehicle fatalities. 
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Specifically, there have been several studies that analyze state- level programs instituted 
to deter alcohol- impaired driving, in order to test which policies are more effective. The 
studies have analyzed policies that restrict the availability of alcohol, such as drinking 
age laws, alcohol taxes, and other alcohol laws. 19  
There have been several state- level studies that have shown that increases in the 
minimum drinking age will result in fewer alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities. 
Wagenaar (1983) found that increases in the legal drinking ages in Maine, Michigan, 
New York, and Pennsylvania produced significant reductions in alcohol-related motor-
vehicle crashes among young drivers aged eighteen to twenty. Wagenaar (1986) 
confirmed these findings for Michigan, and showed that the higher drinking age led to 
long-term reductions in motor-vehicle crashes among young drivers. Legge (1991) 
extended Wagenaar’s analysis of Michigan by analyzing different measures of traffic 
fatalities and found evidence supporting the conclusion that the increase in Michigan’s 
drinking age led to reduced motor-vehicle fatalities for young drivers.  
Other statewide studies of legal drinking age changes have incorporated 
additional methods of deterrence and have found results similar to those presented above. 
Wilkinson (1987) found that increasing the minimum drinking age and closing drinking 
outlets earlier were effective policies in reducing the number of motor-vehicle fatalities. 
                                                 
19 An overview of the economics of alcohol policies (such as taxation, availability 
controls, and minimum drinking ages) is presented in the collection of papers published 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism (1991), entitled: Economics and the Prevention of Alcohol-
Related Problems. 
 43
Legge and Park (1994) concluded that enactment of illegal per se rules and increases in 
the legal drinking age significantly decrease motor-vehicle fatalities.20 
In addition to legal drinking age laws, some studies have analyzed the effect that 
beer taxes have on alcohol consumption and alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities.21 
Ruhm (1996) studied cross-state variations in drinking ages and beer taxes and found that 
higher legal drinking ages and larger beer taxes significantly lower the rate of motor-
vehicle fatalities. Dee (1999) used estimates that were not based on observed state-
specific attributes and showed that beer taxes have an insignificant impact on teen 
drinking (18 to 20 year olds), while movements to higher legal drinking ages 
substantially reduced teen traffic fatalities. Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen (1999) found 
that, after other policies impacting beer consumption are controlled for, beer taxes do not 
significantly affect alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities. However, the authors found 
that a higher drinking age is negatively related to alcohol- related motor-vehicle fatalities. 
Young and Likens (2000) also showed tha t the legal drinking age has a statistically 
significant and negative relationship with total, youth, and alcohol-related traffic 
fatalities, while beer taxes seemingly do not. 
My study is closely related to this literature in that it is an extension of the legal 
drinking age law analysis. Here, however, I am testing the effect that international 
differences in drinking ages have on the occurrence of motor-vehicle fatalities near the 
                                                 
20 Illegal per se rules define a specific blood alcohol concentration, when detected in 
drivers, as conclusive evidence of drunk driving. 
21 There has been some research on the effect that different U.S. state alcohol tax policies 
have on cross-border alcohol sales. For example, Beard, Gant, and Saba (1997) found 
that border-crossing activity, induced by tax avoidance, is a significant determinant of 
state alcohol sales in the United States. The authors also included a 0-1 dummy variable 
to account for states with Canadian borders, and found that Canadians cross the border to 
by liquor. 
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border crossings. The results of the previous literature suggest that the lower dinking age 
in Ontario will lead to higher alcohol-related driving fatalities; some of which will occur 
on the Michigan side of the border.22 As the Canadian customs official said in the 
opening quote, “once they make it over (the bridge), they’re Detroit’s problem.” 
There have also been some studies analyzing county level differences in alcohol 
availability policies to see if they help explain local level motor-vehicle fatalities. The 
two studies presented below analyze the effect that a county’s decision to prohibit alcohol 
sales (become “dry”) has on motor-vehicle fatalities.23  Winn and Giacopassi (1993) 
found that dry counties in Kentucky have a lower rate of alcohol-related motor-vehicle 
fatalities. While Baughman, Conlin, Dickert-Conlin, and Pepper (2001) showed that 
counties in Texas that only allowed the sale of beer and wine experienced decreased 
alcohol-related traffic accidents, and counties that allowed the sale of higher alcohol-
content liquor increased the risk of traffic accidents within their borders. The authors note 
that the decrease in driving fatalities produced from allowing the sale of beer and wine 
may be attributed to the fact that it gives some residents less incentive to drive to non-
prohibitive counties to consume alcohol. Generally, the authors rationalized that the 
reduction in the distance traveled to obtain alcohol and the consumption of lower alcohol-
content beer resulted in less motor-vehicle fatalities. 
                                                 
22 There has been some research performed on the effects of drinking age changes in 
Canada.  Such studies as Simpson, Beirness, Mayhew, and Donelson (1985) and Mayhew 
and Simpson (1990) have shown that lowering the drinking age in Ontario resulted in 
higher alcohol-related crashes in young drivers, and that raising the drinking age 
produced less alcohol-related crashes in young drivers. 
23 It should be noted that dry county analysis does not apply to Michigan during the 
analyzed time period because there were no counties that specifically prohibited the sale 
of alcoholic beverages. 
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Michigan county residents that are aged nineteen or twenty have to drive to the 
nearest border crossing in order to legally obtain and consume alcohol. This is essentially 
increasing the travel distance needed to obtain alcohol, and thus, will result in more 
fatalities in the counties that are near the border crossing. However, some counties are 
relatively far from the border crossings and may not be in reasonable travel distance to 
take advantage of the drinking age differences. Therefore, the border-crossing travel 
effect decreases as a county’s distance from the crossing increases.  
 
3.3 Characteristics of the Michigan-Ontario Border Crossings 
Analysis of Michigan and Ontario is a good choice because there are only three major 
border crossings between the two areas. Also, Michigan is isolated from other outside 
influences because of the surrounding Great Lakes. The three border crossings are 
located in Detroit (Wayne county), Port Huron (St. Clair county), and Sault Ste. Marie 
(Chippewa county). The Detroit border crossing is generally the dominant Michigan-
Ontario crossing as measured by total incoming personal vehicles. The U.S. Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics reported that, in 1997, the Detroit crossing had over 7.4 million 
incoming personal vehicles; while Port Huron had roughly 2.0 million and Sault Ste. 
Marie had just over 1.6 million vehicles.  
In this chapter I hypothesize that the Michigan-Ontario border crossings affect the 
alcohol available to nineteen and twenty-year-old residents of Michigan, and therefore, 
influence the state’s motor-vehicle fatalities. More specifically, the border crossings’ 
effects on motor-vehicle fatalities are strongest in the counties surrounding the border 
crossings, and dissipate out as the distance from the border crossing increases. Also, each 
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border crossing is going to influence a different set of Michigan counties; specifically, 
each crossing will have an effect on the motor-vehicle fatalities of the counties that are in 
close proximity to that crossing. Therefore, the distance from each county seat to the 
nearest border crossings, measured in actual road mileage, is included in my analysis to 
measure the border crossing effect. This distance variable is expected to be significant 
and have a negative sign to show that as distance from a border crossing increases, 
motor-vehicle fatalities will decrease. 
Michigan residents aged nineteen or twenty have incentive to cross the border to 
take advantage of the differences in legal drinking ages, which may be especially true for 
college students studying in Michigan. As stated in the MSU State News article, “The 
Bridge to Adulthood,” many college students cross the borders and “the goals are simple: 
get legal, get drunk, get back across the border without the hassle of Windsor Police.” 
There is a significant population of college students in the counties that are near the 
Michigan border crossings, which puts many nineteen and twenty year old students 
within reasonable driving distances to take advantage of the drinking age differences.  
For example, Wayne State University in Detroit (Wayne County); the University of 
Michigan in Ann Arbor (Washtenaw County); Michigan State University in Lansing 
(Ingham County); and Northern Michigan University in Marquette (Marquette County) 
are all in close proximity to a Michigan-Ontario border crossing. 24 
                                                 
24 Wayne State University (annual enrollment 30,000) is closest to the Detroit border 
crossing being located in Detroit, the University of Michigan (annual enrollment over 
40,000) is about 40 miles from Detroit, Michigan State University (annual enrollment 
over 40,000) is within 100 miles of Detroit and Port Huron, and Northern Michigan 
University (annual enrollment 10,000) is under 150 miles from Sault Ste. Marie. 
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There is an additional crossing incentive that may affect nineteen and twenty-
year-old Michigan residents, as well as residents twenty-one and older—legal casinos.25 
Ontario has had an established casino since 1994, Casino Windsor, while Michigan has 
just recently allowed casinos to move into Detroit in the later part of 1999. The lack of 
casinos in Michigan gives incentives to those residents over the age of nineteen, who 
wish to gamble, to cross the border where casinos are permitted. This is an incentive for 
Michigan residence nineteen and older because, like the province’s drinking age, 
Ontario’s legal gambling age is set at nineteen. It is not the aim of this chapter to analyze 
the effects that gambling traffic has on motor-vehicle fatalities in Michigan; rather it is to 
measure the effect that the lower Ontario drinking age, and the ensuing underage border 
crossing traffic, has on motor-vehicle fatalities in Michigan. However, the gambling 
incentive to cross the border is mentioned because it seems reasonable that casinos, 
which offer free drinks to gambling patrons, create an atmosphere that is somewhat 
conducive to alcohol consumption.   
 
3.4 Count Model and Data Description 
Following the approach of Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen (1999), two measures of motor-
vehicle fatalities were used to test the effect that the border crossings have on Michigan 
counties: total fatalities and alcohol-related fatalities. 26 The authors have noted the 
advantages and disadvantages of both measures, and concluded that using total fatalities 
                                                 
25 For more information on gambling- induced travel refer to Garrett and Marsh (2002). 
The authors found that cross-border lottery shopping between U.S. states significantly 
influences state-generated lottery revenue. Specifically, states are vulnerable to 
significant revenue losses because of competition from neighboring state lotteries. 
26 Both of these measures are consistent with measures used in the literature and were 
obtained from the NHTSA’s Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS). 
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will conceptually give the best estimates of total life saving capabilities of any anti-drunk 
driving policy; while alcohol-related fatalities will best estimate total drunk driving 
deterrence. More specifically, the authors note that the use of total fatalities is optimal 
when estimating the costs of lives lost because “alcohol is involved to some degree in all 
categories of fatal motor vehicle accidents.” The aim of this chapter is to try and quantify 
the impact of the border crossings in terms of the costs of lives lost imposed on the 
counties nearer to the border crossing. Therefore, the results to be particularly highlighted 
are those dealing with the regressions using total fatalities.27  
Each measure of fatalities, total and alcohol-related, is also broken down by age 
of driver; more specifically, into fatalities involving all-aged drivers and fatalities 
involving drivers aged nineteen and twenty. So there were a total of four dependent 
variables used in the estimation process, each measur ing the fatalities that occurred in 
Michigan counties between 1995 and 1999. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics, 
definitions, and sources for the dependent and independent variables used in the 





                                                 
27 The results to be reported involving alcohol-related fatalities do entirely support the 
findings of the regressions run with total fatalities, and will be used to show the 
robustness of my results. It should be noted that the use of alcohol-related fatalities has 
been debated in the literature over the accuracy of the alcohol- involvement measure 
because it is a subjective assessment made by police officers. For more information on 
the controversy over the alcoho l-related measure refer to Winn and Giacopassi (1993) 
and Baughman, Conlin, Dickert-Conlin, and Pepper (2001).  
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics, Definitions, and Sources for Variables 
 
Variable Name (definition) (source) Mean St. Dev.  
Dependent Variables   
Total Fatalities, All Aged Drivers  87.1 153.7 
   (total traffic deaths) (a)   
Total Fatalities, 19 to 20 year old Drivers  4.5 7.4 
   (total traffic deaths involving a Driver aged 19 or 20) (a)   
Alcohol Related Fatalities, All Aged Drivers   24.4 41.6 
   (traffic deaths involving drivers with BAC > 0.01) (a)   
Alcohol Related Fatalities, 19 to 20 year old Drivers  1.3 2.1 
   (traffic deaths involving 19 to 20 year old drivers with BAC > 0.01) (a)   
Independent Variables   
Distance from County Seat to Nearest Border Crossing 1.4 0.7 
   (road travel measured in hundreds of miles from county seat to closest border crossing) (b)   
Population 91.6 215.5 
   (population aged 16 and older, measured in thousands of persons) (c)    
Underage Population  3.5 7.7 
   (population aged 19 and 20, measured in thousands of persons) (c)    
Unemployment Rate  5.5 2.2 
   (civilian unemployment rate) (d)   
Per Capita Income  22.7 4.7 
   (local area per capita personal income, measured in thousands of dollars) (e)   
Police Employment  2.6 9.0 
   (number of sworn officers, measured in hundreds of officers) (f)   
Licensed Bars 2.1 4.2 
   (number of licensed bars, measured in tens of bars) (g)   
Vehicle Miles Traveled  5.8 1.1 
   (estimated miles annually traveled by vehicles, measured in hundred millions of miles) (h)   
DUI arrest share of total arrests  20.0 6.8 
   (DUI arrests / total arrests) (i)    
 
Sources: (a) U.S. Department of Transportation, Fatal Accident Reporting System, 1995-
1999; (b) MapQuest Online Road Mileage Distance Calculator; (c) U.S. Census Bureau, 
1999; (d) Michigan Department of Career Development, 1999; (e) U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 1999; (f) U.S. Census of Governments, 1997; (g) Michigan State 
University, County Tourism Profiles, 1997; (h) Michigan Department of Transportation, 





Other than the measure of distance to the nearest border crossing, the independent 
variables follow closely what has been used in the previous literature. As mentioned in 
Section III, the distance from each county seat to the nearest border crossings, measured 
in actual road mileage, is included to capture the border crossing effect. The distance 
variable is expected to be significant and have a negative sign to show that as distance 
from a border crossing decreases, motor-vehicle fatalities will increase in occurrence.  
The socio-economic variables that are controlled for include the following: 
population, unemployment rate, per capita income, police employment, the number of 
licensed bars, and the average vehicle miles traveled. Population is expected to have a 
positive and significant impact on motor-vehicle fatalities.28 The unemployment rate is 
expected to carry a negative sign because alcohol consumption in bars and restaurants is 
assumed to fall during economic downturns. The per capita income is expected to have a 
negative sign because, as incomes rise, the opportunity cost of taking the risk of drunk 
driving increases; therefore, the activity should be avoided by higher income earners, 
which would reduce the occurrence of motor-vehicle fatalities. Police employment is 
expected to carry a negative sign because more police enforcement of traffic laws, should 
reduce the number of traffic violations, of which drunk-driving is included. The number 
of licensed bars should have a positive sign showing that increased alcohol availability 
will lead to more alcohol consumption, and the things that come along with it. Finally, 
                                                 
28 Fatalities per capita were not incorporated into the count model because dependent 
variables need to be non-negative integers, so division by population would leave non-
integer values for all the fatality measures. Population is controlled for and all 
specifications show a significant and positive relationship between fatalities and the 
number of persons in each county.    
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the average vehicle miles traveled should carry a positive sign, showing that more miles 
driven, on average, should result in more motor-vehicle fatalities.  
The one variable that may be a newer contribution to the explanations of motor-
vehicle fatalities is the DUI share of total arrests. Benson, Mast and Rasmussen (2000) 
used this criminology-based measure in their attempt to better model how police deterrent 
efforts were dispersed in a given location. If the DUI share of total arrest increases for a 
given area, then more police efforts are focused on deterring drunk driving in that area. 
This measure is expected to have a negative sign in my estimation, to show that as more 
resources are allocated to deterring drunk driving, less motor-vehicle fatalities will occur.  
The motor-vehicle fatalities of a specific county are modeled based on the 
expectation that a fatality will occur in that county. The fatalities that occur in a given 
county will be dependent on the county-specific socio-economic factors presented in 
Table 1, and also, on the location of the county in proximity to the border crossings. The 
location of the county is important for capturing the effect of the border crossing and is 
measured as the distance from the county seat to the nearest border crossing. 
In order to model the occurrence of the traffic fatalities in each county, a count 
model estimation technique was used. Given the nature of the data, the count method was 
particularly useful in modeling the traffic fatalities involving drivers aged nineteen and 
twenty because there were limited occurrences in most counties between 1995 and 1999. 
In fact some counties experienced no motor-vehicle fatalities involving drivers aged 
nineteen or twenty during that time span. Simple OLS techniques would be inconsistent 
in estimating such count style data, so the count model was a logical choice for 
estimation technique.  
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The count model is based on a Poisson distribution and follows the general 
framework presented below. In order to assure a non-negative expectation of the 
observed motor-vehicle fatalities, the explanatory variables are modeled as: 
E(YiXi) = λi = exp (β’Xi),    i = 1,…, n  (3.1) 
where the subscript (i) denotes the county (of which n = 83 Michigan counties), Xi is a 
matrix of explanatory variables, β  is a vector of coefficients, and Yi  is the observed 
motor-vehicle fatality values. The observed motor-vehicle fatality values are assumed to 
be drawings from a Poisson distribution with parameter λi. Therefore, the probability 
function of the traffic fatalities is given as: 
f (Yi) = λi
Yi e-λi / Yi!  (3.2) 
The estimation process involves convergence to a unique maximum of the following log-
likelihood function.  
lnL = Σi [-λi + Yiβ’Xi - lnYi!]  , where i = 1…n (3.3) 
The Poisson count model has a limiting assumption that the conditional variance of Yi 
equals its conditional mean. In the case that the conditional mean and variance are not 
equal, the data are said to exhibit overdispersion. A regression-based test for 
overdispersion was performed on each regression specification for all four dependent 
variables.29 The motor-vehicle fatalities involving drivers aged nineteen and twenty, 
show no evidence of over dispersion. So the Poisson model is appropriate to estimate the 
fatalities involving nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers. However, the test results give 
                                                 
29 LIMDEP uses a regression-based test for overdispersion developed by Cameron and 
Trividi (1990) that tests the null hypothesis that the mean and variance are equal. 
Basically, the test uses an overdispersion parameter, which, if found to be significantly 
different from zero, shows evidence of overdispersion. The overdispersion parameters are 
reported along with the regression results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
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evidence that the motor-vehicle fatalities involving all aged drivers are overdispersed. 
Therefore, the all-aged fatalities are modeled using a Negative Binomial count 
regression, which is commonly used to deal with the problem of overdispersion. 
Generally, the Negative Binomial model imbeds the Poisson model, but allows for the 
conditional mean and variance to differ.30  
 
3.5 Estimation Results  
The Negative Binomial count model estimation results of total and alcohol-related 
fatalities involving all-aged drivers are presented in Table 3.2. The Negative Binomial 
goodness of fit is measured by a Chi-squared test statistic. The Chi-squared test statistics 
are presented in the last row of Table 3.2 and all remain significant at the 1% level for 
each regression specification, which shows an overall good fit of the model of motor-
vehicle fatalities involving all-aged drivers.  
The Poisson count model estimation results of total and alcohol-related fatalities 
involving drivers aged nineteen and twenty are presented in Table 3.3. The Poisson 
goodness of fit can be measured by an R-squared value developed by Cameron and 
Windmeijer (1993). The R-squared values are presented in the last row of Table 3.3, and 
show that the estimated models can explain between sixty and seventy percent of the 




                                                 
30 For further discussion and development of the Poisson and Negative Binomial count 
model refer to Greene (2000), Chapter 19. 
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Table 3.2 Negative Binomial Estimates of Motor-Vehicle Fatalities for  
All-Aged Michigan Drivers  
Marginal Effects (absolute value of t-stats) 
 
 Total Fatalities Alcohol-Related Fatalities 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
          
Distance from County Seat to -27.56*** -27.43*** -38.80*** -8.15*** -8.13*** -8.75*** 
Nearest Border Crossing (100 road miles) (6.35) (6.93) (3.82) (3.99) (4.02) (2.71) 
              
          
constant 508.25*** 492.31*** 589.24*** 122.88*** 120.55*** 115.29*** 
  (19.31) (19.24) (10.46) (9.67) (9.72) (2.93) 
          
Population (1,000 persons) 4.80*** 5.62*** 9.11*** 1.60** 1.72** 2.56** 
  (3.14) (3.83) (3.64) (2.08) (2.30) (2.19) 
          
Unemployment Rate -17.74*** -18.95*** -22.59*** -5.51*** -5.70*** -5.69*** 
  (9.89) (10.97) (6.93) (6.29) (6.90) (4.90) 
          
Per Capita Income ($1,000) -1.74** -1.80** -4.17*** -0.99** -1.00** -0.63 
  (2.07) (2.21) (2.61) (2.32) (2.41) (0.97) 
          
Police Employment (100 officers) -9.29*** -9.83*** -8.57** -3.06 -3.15 -2.90 
  (2.70) (2.89) (2.46) (1.30) (1.40) (1.52) 
          
Licensed Bars (10 bars) 13.84*** 15.34*** 11.56*** 4.33*** 4.56*** 4.36** 
  (6.05) (7.11) (2.89) (4.54) (4.87) (2.48) 
          
Vehicle Miles Traveled (100,000,000 miles) 2.45* 1.94  0.77 0.70   
  (1.65) (1.43)  (0.91) (0.86)   
          
DUI arrest share of total arrests -1.11***   -0.17    
  (2.80)   (0.75)    
          
Overdispersion Parameter 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.29*** 
  (10.87) (11.78) (9.74) (5.47) (5.47) (4.84) 
              
          
Number of Observations 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Chi-squared 429.92*** 434.89*** 586.57*** 121.70*** 121.82*** 195.82*** 
 
Significance levels are represented by:  *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration defines alcohol-related accidents as 
involving a driver with a BAC of 0.01 or greater. 
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Table 3.3 Poisson Estimates of Motor-Vehicle Fatalities for  
Michigan Drivers Aged 19 and 20 
Marginal Effects (absolute value of t-stat) 
 
 Total Fatalities Alcohol-Related Fatalities 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
          
Distance from County Seat to -2.10** -2.10** -2.12** -0.67* -0.67* -0.69* 
Nearest Border Crossing (100 road miles) (2.45) (2.45) (2.49) (1.65) (1.64) (1.70) 
              
          
constant 17.18*** 16.87*** 14.96*** 4.14 4.49 3.02 
  (3.08) (3.14) (3.73) (1.46) (1.62) (1.43) 
          
Underage Population (1,000 persons) 0.33** 0.34** 0.36** 0.16* 0.14* 0.15** 
  (1.96) (2.23) (2.37) (1.82) (1.74) (1.99) 
          
Unemployment Rate -1.24*** -1.26*** -1.21*** -0.37* -0.33* -0.30* 
  (3.13) (3.32) (3.29) (1.84) (1.78) (1.66) 
          
Per Capita Income ($1,000) -0.19 -0.19 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.06 
  (0.99) (0.99) (0.95) (1.26) (1.23) (0.97) 
          
Police Employment (100 officers) -0.54*** -0.55*** -0.51*** -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.24*** 
  (3.05) (3.23) (3.38) (3.28) (3.32) (3.51) 
          
Licensed Bars (10 bars) 0.78** 0.81*** 0.87*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 
  (2.53) (2.94) (3.44) (2.56) (2.67) (3.32) 
          
Vehicle Miles Traveled (100,000,000 miles) 0.09 0.08  0.05 0.06   
  (0.57) (0.54)  (0.66) (0.82)   
          
DUI arrest share of total arrests -0.02   -0.03    
  (0.20)   (0.56)    
          
Overdispersion Parameter 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (1.10) (1.10) (1.44) (0.03) (0.06) (0.12) 
              
          
Number of Observations 83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.59 0.59 0.58 
 
Significance levels are represented by:  *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration defines alcohol-related accidents as 
involving a driver with a BAC of 0.01 or greater. 
The reported R-square values are based on calculations developed by Cameron and 
Windmeijer (1993). 
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The figures that are presented in both tables (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) are the marginal 
effects that each independent variable has on the various measures of fatalities. Also, the 
same three regression specifications are run for each of the four measures of fatalities, 
where each specification only differs by the exclusion of the DUI share of total arrests or 
the average vehicle miles trave led.31 
All the socio-economic control variables have the expected signs as outlined in 
Section IV, and vary across regression specifications according to significance and 
magnitude of their effect. The focus of this chapter is primarily on the incentive for 
underage Michigan residents to cross international borders to legally consume alcohol, so 
the variable of particular interest in this study is the measure of distance from the county 
seats to the nearest border crossing. The distance variable is designed to capture the 
border-crossing effect, in that, as the distance to the border crossing gets smaller, motor-
vehicle fatalities increase. The distance measure remains significant and negative 
throughout all the regression specifications, showing that the distance a county is from 
the border crossing does significantly influence its motor-vehicle fatalities. More 
specifically, the closer the county is to the border crossing, it will have higher total and 
alcohol-related fatalities for all-aged drivers, and for drivers age nineteen and twenty. 
                                                 
31 The DUI share of total arrests was excluded from regression specifications [2], [3], [5], 
and [6] for two reasons. First, because it is a rather new contribution to the literature and 
its importance in the modeling of motor-vehicle fatalities is still being developed. 
Second, because the variable did not generally exert a significant influence on the 
different measures of motor-vehicle fatalities from a policy impact point of view. The 
DUI share however was shown to significantly reduce the total fatalities involving all-
aged drivers. Also, the DUI share retained its negative sign throughout the regression 
specifications it was included in. The vehicle miles traveled were also excluded from 
regression specifications [3] and [6] because the variable did not generally exert a 
significant influence on the different measures of motor-vehicle fatalities in any of the 
specifications it was included in.    
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In order to quantify the border crossing effect, the regressions involving total 
fatalities of all-aged drivers and drivers aged nineteen and twenty will be highlighted. 
The use of total fatalities is founded in the statements by Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen 
(1999), that a measure of total fatalities will conceptually give the best estimates of total 
life saving capabilities of any anti-drunk driving policy. This statement supports the use 
of total fatalities to capture the entire cost burden of lives lost due to drunk driving 
behavior. The analysis that follows will begin with examination of total fatalities 
involving all aged drivers, and continue on to analysis of total fatalities involving 
nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers. It should be noted that the total fatalities of all-aged 
drivers do include the fatalities of nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers. Also, as noted by 
Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen (1999), “alcohol is involved to some degree in all 
categories of fatal motor vehicle accidents,” so the total fatality measure is all inclusive 
of alcohol-related fatalities. 
Examining the results for total fatalities of all aged drivers, which are presented in 
Table 2, shows that a county’s proximity to a border crossing significantly influences 
motor-vehicle fatalities. More specifically, as distance from the border crossing increases, 
the county will experience less motor vehicle fatalities. The marginal effects of the 
distance variable that are presented in specifications [1], [2], and [3] reveal that, as 
distance from the nearest border crossing is increased by one hundred road miles, motor 
vehicle fatalities decrease by roughly 30. In other words, a border-crossing county, when 
compared to a county located one hundred miles away, has approximately 30 more 
motor-vehicle fatalities involving all-aged drivers, on average over the five years 
analyzed. Given that the average Michigan county is 150 miles from the nearest border 
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crossing, the estimated model implies that the three border crossing counties experience 
roughly 45 more motor-vehicle fatalities than the average Michigan county between 1995 
and 1999, strictly because of their proximity to the international border. 
These additional motor-vehicle fatalities that are a result of the border-crossing 
effect impose a significant cost on the border crossing counties. According to the cost 
estimates produced by Jensen, Miller, and Covington (1999), the average motor-vehicle 
fatality in Michigan, which resulted from impaired driving, costs $3.7 million. 32 This 
means that the border-crossing counties, which experience 45 more motor-vehicle 
fatalities of all-aged drivers than the average Michigan county, will shoulder a cost 
burden of roughly $166.5 million more than the average Michigan county, strictly 
because of their proximity to the border crossings. 
   Looking more specifically at the results for total fatalities of nineteen and 
twenty-year-old drivers, which are presented in Table 3, shows that a county’s proximity 
to a border crossing, again, significantly influences motor-vehicle fatalities. The marginal 
effects of the distance variable that are presented in specifications [1], [2], and [3] reveal 
that, as distance from the nearest border crossing is increased by one hundred road miles, 
motor vehicle fatalities involving nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers decrease by two 
deaths. Recalling that the average Michigan county is 150 miles from the nearest border 
crossing, the estimated model implies that each border crossing county experiences 
roughly three more motor-vehicle fatalities of nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers than 
the average Michigan county between 1995 and 1999, strictly because of their proximity 
to the international border. Three fatalities may not seem significant in magnitude. 
                                                 
32 Jensen, Miller, and Covington (1999) separate the $3.7 million fatality costs into $1.4 
million in monetary costs, and $2.3 million in quality of life losses. 
 59
However, after taking into account the fact that, between 1995 and 1999, twenty-four 
percent of the Michigan counties did not experience even one motor-vehicle fatality 
involving a nineteen or twenty-year-old driver; the three additional fatalities created by 
the border crossing effect seem more significant. 
The additional motor-vehicle fatalities resulting from the border-crossing effect 
impose a significant cost on the border crossing counties. Recalling the cost estimates 
produced by Jensen, Miller, and Covington (1999), the border-crossing counties, which 
experience three more motor-vehicle fatalities of nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers 
than the average Michigan county, will shoulder a cost burden of $11.1 million more than 
the average Michigan county, strictly because of their proximity to the border crossings. 
 Predicted fatalities were obtained for selected Michigan counties in order to 
highlight the differences between the fatalities of border crossing counties and non-
border crossing counties in Michigan. More specifically, predictions of total fatalities for 
all-aged drivers and nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers were obtained for the three 
border crossing counties and also for the three control (non-border crossing) counties of 
comparable socio-economic backgrounds.33 The predicted fatalities for each county were 
then used to calculate the cost burden of the fatalities, based on the Jensen, Miller, and 
Covington (1999) estimate of the average cost for an alcohol-related motor-vehicle 
fatality occurring in Michigan. Both the predicted fatalities, and the resulting costs 
estimates are presented in Table 3.4. 
 
 
                                                 
33 The pairings of border-crossing counties and control counties were based on 
population, underage population, per capita income, and unemployment measures.  
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Table 3.4 Predicted Number of Total Motor-Vehicle Fatalities and Fatality Costs  
for Selected Michigan Counties 
 
 All-Aged Drivers 19 and 20 Year-Old Drivers 
County Name Total Fatalities Costs (millions) Total Fatalities Costs (millions) 
   Chippewa (Sault Ste. Marie) 62.5 $231 3.8 $14 
   Alpena 35.5 $131 1.6 $6 
         
   St. Clair (Port Huron) 153.8 $569 10.0 $37 
   Saginaw 114.2 $423 5.9 $22 
         
   Wayne (Detroit) 1268.1 $4,692 55.4 $205 
   Oakland 524.3 $1,940 20.3 $75 
 
Note: Pairings of border crossing counties and control counties were based on population, 
underage population, per capita income, and unemployment measures. 
 
 
 The results presented in Table 3.4 really help to highlight the differences in 
motor-vehicle fatalities between border crossing counties and non-border crossing 
counties of comparable socio-economic background. In each pairing, the border-crossing 
county had substantially higher predicted motor-vehicle fatalities, and therefore, 
significantly higher fatality costs imposed on the county. It is the costs of the lives lost 
that have raised a lot of concern in the Michigan areas close to the Michigan-Ontario 
border crossings. 
  This chapter was not intended to judge which drinking age is better, Michigan’s 
age of 21 or Ontario’s age of 19; rather this chapter has tried to quantify the cost impact 
of the border crossing activity that has been produced by the difference in drinking ages. 
However the fatality costs that are imposed on the border crossing counties need to be 
addressed with some policy implications. One implication is that the border crossing 
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patrol officers, for both Michigan and Ontario, need to devote more resources to the 
prevention of alcohol- impaired border-crossing Americans.  
Inspection of the DUI share measures for each Michigan county showed that 
Wayne county (the county where Detroit is located) has the lowest police effort to deter 
drunk driving out of all Michigan counties, in 1999. Also, the other two border crossing 
counties, and many of the counties that surround them, have relatively low measures of 
police determent of drunk driving. With the low levels of DUI deterrence efforts, more 
drivers can drink and drive undetected in the counties around the border crossings, and 
this allows higher levels of motor-vehicle fatalities to occur in those counties.  
The prevention of impaired border crossing activity can obviously be improved. 
This is exemplified by a statement made by an officer of the Detroit Police Department, 
in the State News article “The Bridge to Adulthood,” who stated that the Detroit police 
had “no knowledge” of Americans returning from Windsor drunk. This statement directly 
contradicts the statement made by the Canadian border patrol in the opening of this 
chapter that 75 percent of the Michigan kids cross drunk. If the Michigan and Ontario 
police and border patrols improve and cooperate in their drunk-driving prevention efforts, 
some motor-vehicle fatalities will be avoided. Previous studies have shown conclusive 
evidence that increasing the resources devoted to drunk driving prevention decreases the 
occurrence of motor-vehicle fatalities, the most serious outcome of mixing alcohol and 
driving. Most recently, Benson, Mast, and Rasmussen (2000) have shown that police 
deterrence efforts can significantly increase the probability of arrest for drunk driving, 




In this chapter, I explore the impact that Michigan-Ontario border crossings have on the 
motor-vehicle fatalities that occurred in Michigan counties. The results show that the 
closer the county is to an international border crossing, it will have higher alcohol-related 
motor-vehicle fatalities for drivers aged nineteen and twenty, and more generally for all 
aged-drivers. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that the lower drinking age in 
Ontario gives incentive for underage Michigan residents to cross the border in order to 
consume and purchase alcohol. Specifically, the added consumption of alcohol produced 
by the lower drinking age, when mixed with driving, has been shown to increase alcohol-
related fatalities in the counties near a Michigan-Ontario border crossing.  
The border crossing impact was quantified in terms of the costs from lives lost 
that are imposed on the counties nearer to the border crossing. Specifically, the border-
crossing counties will face a cost burden above the average Michigan county’s costs that 
is roughly $166.5 million more for motor-vehicle fatalities of all-aged drivers and $11.1 
million more for fatalities of nineteen and twenty-year-old drivers. One policy 
implication that comes from the costs imposed on the border crossing counties, is that the 
border crossing patrols need to devote more resources to preventing alcohol- impaired 
border crossing traffic. Ultimately, some cooperative policies against impaired border 
crossing activity, between the Michigan and Ontario border patrols, may be needed to 
thwart some of the motor-vehicle fatalities produced by the border crossing effect. 
Although, this study focused on Michigan-Ontario border crossings, many other U.S. 
states share borders with Canada and Mexico, where drinking ages are currently lower 
than twenty-one. My findings suggest that international border crossings significantly 
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influence alcohol-related driving fatalities in the areas near the crossings. Therefore, the 
international border effect should be included in future studies that attempt to model the 








An entrepreneur is an individual who assumes the financial risk of developing or 
managing a new venture, where the venture is based on a new idea or an innovative way 
of performing a task. The 'entrepreneurial spirit' is something that has long been 
associated with the driving force behind economic progress and growth. Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942) stated that the key to the success of markets lies in the spirits of 
entrepreneurs who persist in developing new products and technologies, and succeed at 
ultimately reducing production costs. Kaiser (1990) modeled the entrepreneur based on 
many historical characterizations, including the Schumpeterian innovator, and concluded 
that the major characteristics of the entrepreneur—innovator, risk taker, and resource 
allocator—are complementary and inseparable facets of entrepreneurship. Kirzner (1997) 
argues that the entrepreneurial discovery process is vital to the effectiveness of markets, 
where discovery entails entrepreneurs discovering profit opportunities by trial and error. 
In this same respect, Jenner (1998) models the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial process as 
a dynamic process were entrepreneurs search for new combinations of products and 
production techniques that will led to increased productivity and economic growth. 
Recently, the conceptual link between entrepreneurship and economic growth has 
received renewed interest by economists. The finding that increased entrepreneurial 
activity leads to greater economic growth is now well founded at both the national and 
local level. For example, Reynolds, Hay, and Camp (1999) show that a country’s level of 
entrepreneurial activity explains a significant portion of the differences in national 
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economic growth rates. In addition to the national link between entrepreneurship and 
economic growth, recent studies have focused more attention on the local level. 
According to Henderson (2002), entrepreneurs significantly impact local economies by 
fostering localized job creation, increasing wealth and incomes, and ultimately helping to 
connect local economies to the larger, global economy. 
Based on the increasing awareness of the role of entrepreneurs in driving 
economic growth, state and local economic development efforts have been more heavily 
directed toward promoting entrepreneurship. These development efforts have mainly 
focused on reducing the financial constraints that entrepreneurs face either through 
preferential loans to new businesses, as those supported by the Small Business 
Administration, or preferential tax treatment for new or small businesses. One such 
policy that has recently gained popularity is to devote public resources toward attracting 
and building a larger amount of venture capital to encourage entrepreneurial activity. 
This development strategy is largely based on casual observation that areas with larger 
amounts of entrepreneurial activity generally tend to also have a larger amount of venture 
capital.   
A recent, controversial policy alternative has been popularized by Richard Florida 
(2002) in his book The Rise of the Creative Class. The author proposes that instead of 
focusing on developing capital inputs, development efforts should be focused toward 
making areas more attractive to bring in and nourish creative, entrepreneurial individuals. 
Florida (2002) traces the growing role of creativity in our economy by documenting 
many fundamental changes in American society. 
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In this chapter it is proposed that the main difference between these competing 
development strategies is a question of the direction of causation between entrepreneurial 
activity and the quantity of venture capital. The analysis then proceeds to answer this 
'which comes first, the chicken or the egg' question with an empirical test to determine 
whether it is more venture capital that causes more entrepreneurial activity in an area, or 
whether the presence of more entrepreneurial activity simply, and automatically, causes 
more venture capital to flow into an area.34 Not only is this an interesting academic 
question, but it also has significant implications for how best to direct the limited 
resources available for state and local economic development efforts. Quite simply put, 
the question is whether it is best to devote development efforts toward bringing in venture 
funds (or alternatively, focusing on building formal angel investment groups) or to focus 
on efforts to encourage more entrepreneurial activity among individuals in an area (or 
alternatively, to attract entrepreneurs to the area). Even more interesting is the possibility 
that there is causation running simultaneously in both directions between venture capital 
and entrepreneurial activity. If these two phenomenon have this type of relationship, 
development efforts will only be successful if resources are devoted simultaneously to 
promoting both larger venture funds and encouraging entrepreneurial activity among 
individuals. 
Section 4.2 of the chapter proceeds by discussing the relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. In Section 4.3 analysis proceeds to 
uncover the direction of causality between venture capital and entrepreneurial activity. 
                                                 
34 Thurman and Fisher (1988) attempt to empirically answer the question of which came 
first the chicken or the egg, by running Granger causality tests between U.S. egg 
production and chicken populations and conclude that the egg came first. 
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Based on these results, Section 4.4 considers the issue of which government policies best 
stimulate the underlying causal factors that promote entrepreneurship. Finally, Section 
4.5 will present concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 The Relationship Between Entrepreneurial Activity and Economic Growth 
Entrepreneurship is increasingly becoming recognized as a key factor contributing to 
economic growth. As argued by Minniti (1999), entrepreneurs are the catalysts for 
economic growth because they create a networking externality that promotes the creation 
of new ideas and new market formations. The finding that increased entrepreneurial 
activity leads to greater economic growth has been well founded at both the national and 
local levels. For example, Reynolds, Hay, and Camp (1999) show that one-third of the 
differences in national economic growth rates can be attributed to the level of 
entrepreneurship in each country. Supporting these findings, Zacharakis, Bygrave, and 
Sheperd (2000) study sixteen developed economies and find that entrepreneurial activity 
explains approximately one-half of the differences in GDP growth between countries. 
More recently, Henderson (2002) argues that entrepreneurs significantly impact 
economic activity at a more local level through fostering localized job creation, 







Table 4.1 Summary Statistics, Definitions, and Sources for Variables 
Variable Name (source) Description Mean (st. dev.) 
Causality Test Variables   
Annual GSP Growth (a) 
 
Annual percent change in Gross State Product, calculated 
as: ((GSPt – GSPt-1)/ GSPt-1) 
6.67 
(4.30) 
Sole Proprietorship (a) 
 
Annual Nonfarm proprietors employment as revealed 
through income tax data 
389,608.14 
(466,830.31) 
Patent Activity (b) 
 
Number of annual utility patents granted in the U.S., which 
are received for all general U.S. inventions 
1,028.63 
(1,589.51) 
Venture Capital Investment (c) 
 
Venture capital investment to U.S. companies (from all 
sources, including non-U.S.) in millions of current dollars 
426.06 
(1,012.92) 
Entrepreneurial Growth Variables    
Sole Proprietor Growth (a) 
 
Percent change in Nonfarm proprietors employment 
(NPE), calculated as: ((NPE2000 – NPE1996)/ NPE1996) 
10.98 
(4.77) 
Patent Growth (b) 
 




Economic Freedom Index (d) 
 
Composite index measure of state policies that affect 
individual economic freedom 
6.68 
(0.50) 
Death Tax Law (e) 
 
Dummy=1 if the state levies an estate, inheritance, or gift 
tax beyond the federal rate 
0.32 
(0.47) 
Tax Limitation Law (f) 
 
Dummy=1 if the state has enacted some form of 
supermajority tax limitation law 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Minimum Wage (g) 
 




Percent with High School Degree (h) 
 
Percent of population receiving a high school degree as 
their highest level of education (%) 
82.88 
(4.90) 
Percent with College Degree (h) 
 
Percent of population receiving a 4-yr. college degree as 
their highest level of education (%) 
22.99 
(4.35) 
Percent Males (i) 
 




Percent White (i) 
 




Median Age (h) 
 




Unemployment Rate (i) 
 




Percent Union Membership (i) 
 




Percent Service Employment (i) 
 




Violent Crime Rate (j) 
 
Number of violent crimes per 100,000 population, which 
includes murder, rape, robbery, and assault offenses 
505.84 
(251.95) 
Sources: (a) U.S. BEA, State and Local Area Data; (b) U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Utility Patent 
Counts by Country/State and Yea (2001); (c) PricewaterhouseCoopers / Thomson Venture Economics / 
NVCA Moneytree, Venture Capital Profiles (2002); (d) Karabegovic, Amela; Fred McMahon and 
Dexter Samida. Economic Freedom of North America (2002); (e) CCH Incorporated, State Estate Taxes, 
(2002); (f) Americans for Tax Reform, Tax Limitation Amendment & Supermajority in the States 
(2002); (g) Macpherson, David, State Minimum Wage Data; (h) U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States; (i) U.S. BLS, State and Area Labor Force Statistics; (j) U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. 
 69
In order to enhance the existing evidence on the link between entrepreneurship 
and economic growth for current purposes, I perform state level panel causality tests on 
state annual gross state product (GSP) growth rates and two measures of entrepreneurial 
activity. More specifically, the measures of entrepreneurial activity include sole 
proprietorships and patent activity. 35 Descriptions of all variables used in this chapter, 
along with the sources of this data, are given in Table 4.1. 
The first measure of entrepreneurial activity, sole proprietorships, has been widely 
supported in the literature as a good proxy for the level of entrepreneurship. The Bureau 
of Economic Analysis reports the number of sole proprietors based on federal income tax 
forms filed by individuals of each state.36 The second measure of entrepreneurship, patent 
activity, is new to this chapter, and is measured as the number of utility patents (those 
received for general inventions or innovations) granted annually in each state. The logic 
behind patent activity as a measure of entrepreneurship rests in the notion that the most 
                                                 
35 My analysis, using causality tests, add to the robustness of the observations made by 
the previous literature that link high entrepreneurial activity to increased economic 
growth because the causality tests allow for reverse causation running from economic 
growth to the level of entrepreneurial activity.   
36 Although the measure of sole proprietors as an indicator of entrepreneurship is widely 
supported in the literature, there is a possible short-coming of this measure in that it 
includes both high-growth entrepreneurs and lifestyle entrepreneurs. For a discussion on 
these two types of entrepreneurs refer to Henderson (2002). Ideally, a measure that just 
captures high-growth entrepreneurs would be more advantageous in modeling the 
innovative and growth orientated functions of entrepreneurship. However, the existing 
measure of sole proprietors will be used in this chapter’s analysis to parallel what has 
been used in the prior literature, and will be compared to the new measure of patent 
activity that this chapter contributes as another indicator of entrepreneurship that is 
designed to better capture the innovative, and more growth-orientated outcome of 
entrepreneurship. 
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direct and visible outcome of the entrepreneurial process is innovation, which should be 
reflected in the quantity of patents.37 
 The causality test procedure used here builds on the Granger (1969) and Sims 
(1972) causality framework by modifying the test to incorporate the pooled time-series 
properties of all the fifty states. One problem that may arise in using the pooled state data 
is that the differences across states may be significant enough to bias the true time series 
information that is available in the data. Following the approach of Blomstrom, Lipsey, 
and Zejan (1996) and Farr, Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998), state intercept dummies were 
included in each regression specification to avoid the possible bias of cross state 
differences by controlling for any state-specific influences.38 Specifically, the effect of 
the state intercept dummies is to remove the cross-sectional differences of the states, 
while leaving only the time series variations to be analyzed. 
                                                 
37 Ideally, a more superior measure of patent activity would be to measure the number of 
patent applications per state, however this data, to my knowledge, does not exist at the 
state level. The applications data would be superior because it would not only account for 
the patent activity that was successful (those granted patent rights), but also those 
innovated activities that did not result in a granted patent right. Also, the time period 
between when a patent application is submitted and when the granted patent is received 
can be somewhat prolonged. However, referring to the survey of Griliches (1990) there is 
generally a 65% patent application granting rate in the United States, and from 1880 to 
1989, patent grants have followed closely with the trend of patent applications (refer to 
Griliches (1990) Figure 1, p.1664). Therefore, the patent grants should be a reasonable 
measure of patent activity in the states. 
38 The state intercept dummy parameter estimates are not reported with the causality 
regression results but are available on request.  
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 The general Granger-Sims causality test of two variables X and Y, modified for 
state panel data can be seen in the following equations, where equation (4.1) tests 
causality running from X to Y, and equation (4.2) tests causality running from Y to X.  39  
Yt,i  =  α i  +  ∑
m=1
M
 αm Yt-m,i    +  ∑
n=1
N
 αn Xt-n,i    + εt,i (4.1) 
Xt,i  =  βi  +  ∑
v=1
V
 β vXt-v,i    + ∑
w=1
W
 β wYt-w,i    + δt,i (4.2) 
Note that the subscript i refers to the corresponding state observation; the error terms εt,i 
and δt,i are assumed to be white noise; and, the number of lagged values (M and N or V 
and W) of the independent variables are chosen to adequately capture the relationship 
between X and Y. 
 To check for a one-way causal relationship, both directions of causality have to be 
investigated. To test if X Granger causes Y, equation (4.1) is estimated with and without 
the lagged X variables, and then an F-test is performed to test the null hypothesis that αn 
= 0 for n=1,…,N. Rejecting the null hypothesis would show that X Granger causes Y. To 
test if Y Granger causes X, equation (4.2) is estimated with and without the lagged Y 
variables, and then an F-test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βw  = 0 for 
w=1,…,W. Rejecting the null hypothesis would show that Y Granger causes X.  
 
 
                                                 
39 The modified Granger-Sims framework will be used in this section to test the causality 
between entrepreneurship and economic growth, and will also be used in Section III to 
test the causality between entrepreneurship and venture capital investment. 
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This general framework is used to run causality tests between annual GSP growth, 
sole proprietorships, and patent activity in the United States between 1980-2000, and the 
results are presented in Table 4.2.40 The results show that there is a one-way causal 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth. Specifically, the level of 
sole proprietors was found to Granger cause GSP growth (specifications 1 and 3 in Table 
4.2), and the level of patent activity was shown to Granger cause GSP growth 
(specifications 2 and 5 in Table 4.2). Also, tests were performed to determine the 
direction of causality between the two measures of entrepreneurship, and the tests 
revealed that dual causality exists between sole proprietors and patent activity 
(specifications 4 and 6 in Table 4.2). The dual causality result is not surprising 
considering they are both used to measure entrepreneurial activity. 
The causality results, showing a one-way causal relationship running from state 
entrepreneurship to economic growth strengthen the well-documented link between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth. Also, the state- level analysis seems to bridge the 
gap between the national and local links of entrepreneurs to economic growth.   In order to 
check the robustness of these results, several other specifications of causality tests were 
performed using various measures of economic growth and entrepreneurial activity. The 
                                                 
40 The Granger-Sims test structure reported in Table 4.2 includes only one lag of the 
independent variables, in part, because of the limited number of observations and also to 
conserve on degrees of freedom. However, causality tests were run using two lags of the 
independent variables and the results are virtually identical to the results presented in 
Table 4.2. It should be noted that a more simplified t-test can be run in the causality tests 
that incorporate only one lag, however, the more general F-test is also acceptable. 
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results are presented in the appendix of this dissertation, and generally support the overall 
finding that entrepreneurial activity causes economic growth. 41  
The next question that has to be addressed then is “what factors contribute to the 
formation, or attraction, of entrepreneurial activity that is the driving force behind 
economic growth?” One variable that has been widely supported in the literature as a 
major determinant of entrepreneurial activity is the amount of venture capital investment, 
or lending to small businesses, that is available to entrepreneurs. The next section of this 
chapter will use the same modified Granger-Sims causality framework to explore the 
direction of causality between venture capital funding and entrepreneurial activity.
                                                 
41 In order to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 4.2, the same 
causality tests were performed on per capita measures of GSP growth and entrepreneurial 
activity. (The descriptive statistics for all variables introduced in the Appendix are 
presented in Table A.1.) Specifically, causality tests were run between per capita GSP 
growth, sole proprietors per 1,000 employees, and patents per 1,000 employees. The 
results of this exercise are presented in Appendix Table A.2, and generally follow the 
results presented in Table 4.2. The per capita causality results show that a dual causal 
relation exists between sole proprietors per capita and per capita GSP growth; patents per 
capita Granger cause per capita GSP growth; and a dual causal relation exists between 
sole proprietors per capita and patents per capita. A final robustness check was performed 
by running the same causality tests on per capita measures of GSP growth and the growth 
of entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, causality tests were run between per capita GSP 
growth, per capita sole proprietor growth, and per capita patent growth. The results of 
this exercise are presented in Appendix Table A.3, and generally follow the results 
presented in Table 4.2. The per capita causality results show that no causal relation exists 
between per capita sole proprietor growth and per capita GSP growth (however, per 
capita sole proprietor growth Granger causes per capita GSP growth at the 14% 
significance level); no causal relation exists between per capita patent growth and per 
capita GSP growth (however, per capita patent growth Granger causes per capita GSP 
growth at the 12% significance level); and per capita sole proprietor growth causes per 
capita patent growth. In general, the results of the robustness checks give some additional 
support to the overall finding that entrepreneurs cause economic growth. 
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Table 4.2 Causality Test Results between State Entrepreneurial Activity and Economic Growth 
 (absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Note: State Dummy Variables were included in each regression specification, and the estimated coefficients are available upon request 
to the author. 
 
 Annual GSP Growth Sole Proprietors Patent Activity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Annual GSP Growth (t-1) 0.266*** 0.281*** 92.764  0.680   
    (percent) (9.06) (9.69) (0.65)  (0.46)   
          
Sole Proprietors (t-1) 0.004***  995.288*** 955.720***  0.819*** 
    (thousands of proprietors) (3.36)  (196.66) (101.36)  (8.49) 
          
Patent Activity (t-1)   0.037*  943.388*** 107.054*** 92.468*** 
    (hundreds of patents)   (1.73)  (4.82) (98.93) (46.20) 
              
          
Result/Finding Sole Proprietors Patent Activity GSP Growth Patent Activity GSP Growth Sole Proprietors 
  Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes 
  GSP Growth GSP Growth Sole Proprietors Sole Proprietors Patent Activity Patent Activity 
       
F-statistic [1, 998] 11.30*** 3.00* 0.42 23.24*** 0.22 72.07*** 
              
          
Number of Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 
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4.3 The Relationship Between Venture Capital and Entrepreneurial Activity 
One variable that has been widely supported in the literature as a major determinant of 
entrepreneurial activity is the amount of venture capital investment, or lending to small 
businesses, that is available to entrepreneurs. The Corporation for Enterprise 
Development (2001), lists eight core elements of an infrastructure necessary for 
supporting entrepreneurship, where six of the eight elements revolved around the 
financing that was available for potential entrepreneurs. Also, highlighting the 
importance of financing, Henderson (2002) states that the availability of financial 
resources in an area, especially venture capital investment, is vital to developing 
entrepreneurs. However, one important idea that has generally been over looked by 
previous authors is the notion that venture capital investment may be endogenous to the 
model of entrepreneurial activity. More specifically, it is hard to determine if the venture 
capital investment is creating entrepreneurship, or if the investment is simply flowing to 
the states that already have significant levels of entrepreneurial activity.  
The causal relationship between entrepreneurial activity and venture capital 
investment is important for policy makers, because if venture capital causes 
entrepreneurship, policy makers should target their limited development resources toward 
promoting venture capital investment in their state. However, if venture capital 
investment simply follows entrepreneurial activity, then policy makers should focus 
attention on creating a positive environment that encourages individual entrepreneurs, 




Table 4.3 Causality Test Results between State Entrepreneurial Activity and Venture Capital Investment 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
 Venture Capital Investment Sole Proprietors Patent Activity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Venture Capital Investment (t-1) 0.428*** 0.214*** -0.441  0.002   
    (millions of dollars) (8.42) (4.39) (0.55)  (0.14)   
          
Sole Proprietors (t-1) 4.558***  969.335*** 926.330***  1.728*** 
    (thousands of proprietors) (5.39)  (72.18) (53.61)  (6.15) 
          
Patent Activity (t-1)   146.664***  791.404*** 90.124*** 69.845*** 
    (hundreds of patents)   (11.60)  (2.94) (23.32) (15.98) 
              
          
 Result/Finding Sole Proprietors Patent Activity Venture Capital Patent Activity Venture Capital Sole Proprietors 
  Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes 
 Venture Capital Venture Capital Sole Proprietors Sole Proprietors Patent Activity Patent Activity 
       
F-statistic [1,334] 29.11*** 134.66*** 0.30 8.65*** 0.02 37.87*** 
              
          
Number of Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 
R-squared 0.61 0.70 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Note: State Dummy Variables were included in each regression specification, and the estimated coefficients are available upon request 
to the author. Also, California was omitted as an outlier. 
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The modified Granger-Sims causality framework presented in the previous 
section is used to run causality tests between venture capital investment and the two 
measures of entrepreneurial activity—sole proprietorships and patent activity—in the 
United States between 1992-2001 and the results are presented in Table 4.3.42 The 
measure of venture capital investment is constructed by PricewaterhouseCoopers / 
Thomson Venture Economics / NVCA Moneytree (2002) and includes cash-for-equity 
investments by professional venture capital firms in private emerging companies in the 
United States, where the venture capital firm can be based in the United States or 
abroad.43 It should be noted that the term ‘professional venture capital firm’ refers to the 
following types of firms: Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs), venture arms 
of corporations, institutions, investment banks, and similar entities whose primary 
activity is venture capital investing. 
                                                 
42 Due to data limitations on venture capital investment Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming were not included in the causality 
tests between entrepreneurship and venture capital investment. Also, the California 
observations were suppressed because standard outlier tests revealed that California is a 
statistical outlier in venture capital investment. Specifically, California’s observations 
had standardized residuals that were greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean 
in absolute value. Casual observation of California’s annual share of U.S. venture capital 
investment reveals that the state receives roughly 35% of the total investments, on 
average over the sample period. The next two states receiving the next largest levels of 
venture capital (Texas and Massachusetts) combine to only account for roughly 12% of 
the total investments, on average over the sample period. 
43 It should be acknowledge that this measure of venture capital is capturing the 
equilibrium quantity of venture capital that simultaneously reflects both the quantity 
demand and quantity supplied of venture funding, which may not be the best measure for 
causality testing that in general tries to establish time priority of events. A more 
appropriate measure of venture capital would be a latent variable supply of venture 
funding that matters more in this causality testing framework. However, such a variable 
does not exist to my knowledge, so the available measure of venture capital will have to 
serve as a second best alternative. 
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The causality tests results between the measures of state entrepreneurial activity 
and venture capital investment (presented in Table 4.3) show that a one-way causal 
relationship exists between state entrepreneurship and venture capital investment.44 
Specifically, the level of sole proprietors was found to Granger cause venture capital 
(specifications 1 and 3 in Table 4.3), and the level of patent activity was shown to 
Granger cause venture capital (specifications 2 and 5 in Table 4.3). Again, tests were 
performed to determine the direction of causality between the two measures of state 
entrepreneurship, and the tests revealed that dual causality exists between sole proprietors 
and patent activity (specifications 4 and 6 in Table 4.3). 45 
The causality results, showing a one-way causal relationship running from state 
entrepreneurship to venture capital investment shows that venture capital investment 
funds are simply flowing to the areas with already established entrepreneurial activity. In 
other words, the answer to this chicken and egg problem is that entrepreneurs come first, 
and venture capital follows. One explanation of this finding is that venture capital 
                                                 
44 Again, the Granger-Sims structure includes only one lag of the independent variable 
for the reasons stated earlier, but also, this one- lag relationship seems to best reflect the 
highly mobile characteristics of venture capital investment, which freely and rapidly 
respond to ever-changing market conditions. It should be noted that the causality tests 
were run using two-lags of the independent variables and the results were not 
substantially different from the ones reported in Table 4.3. The only difference is that 
there is a weak dual-causality relation found between patent activity and venture capital 
investment at the 10% confidence level. 
45 In order to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 4.3, the same 
causality tests were performed on per capita measures of venture funding and 
entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, causality tests were run between venture capital 
investment per firm, sole proprietors per 1,000 employees, and patents per 1,000 
employees. The results of this exercise are presented in Appendix Table A.4, and 
generally enhance the results presented in Table 4.3. The per capita causality results show 
that no causal relation exists between sole proprietors per capita and venture capital per 
firm; patents per capita Granger cause venture capital per firm; and sole proprietors per 
capita Granger cause patents per capita. Clearly, these results support the finding that 
venture capital investment does not cause entrepreneurial activity. 
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investment is inherently more mobile than labor; which would imply that, as 
entrepreneurship rises in a particular geographic area, new venture capital tends to 
automatically, and freely, flows to fund the entrepreneurial activity in the area.46  
It is important to note that the results do not contradict the idea that venture 
capital is important in the entrepreneurial process. In fact, the results are most consistent 
with the literature on entrepreneurial survival suggesting that once an entrepreneurial 
venture is started, that venture funding significantly increases the chances of survival for 
the new venture.47  What the results do say, however, is that focusing development efforts 
on bringing in more venture or angel funding will not be an effective method of 
encouraging the higher levels of entrepreneurial activity necessary for economic growth. 
Rather, attracting and promoting underlying entrepreneurial activity must be the focus of 
development efforts and venture funding will automatically flow into the area activity.  
 
4.4 State Policies that Promote Entrepreneurship 
The empirical results from Section III suggest that entrepreneurial activity (measured by 
patents and sole proprietorships) tends to be the underlying factor that attracts more 
                                                 
46 This finding that entrepreneurial activity causes financing, and the earlier finding that 
entrepreneurial activity causes economic growth may help to shed light on a puzzle that is 
prevalent in another strand of the economic growth literature. As noted by Shan, Morris, 
and Sun (2001), the puzzle is over the causal relationship between financial development 
and economic growth, were the authors report that no conclusive evidence exists on the 
direction of causality. More specifically, Shan, Morris, and Sun (2001) find dual causality 
between the financial development of OECD countries and their corresponding economic 
growth rates. Our results suggest that entrepreneurial activity causes both economic 
growth and financial investment flows; therefore, the finding of dual causality may come 
from the fact that the entrepreneurial activity is driving both measures simultaneously.  
47 Bates (1990), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994), and Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1998) all present evidence that financing is key to the survival of entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
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venture capital to an area. The remaining question is then how to structure government 
policy to encourage more entrepreneurial activity among individuals in an area (either by 
making current residents more entrepreneurial or by attracting new entrepreneurs to the 
area). One such structure for government policy is suggested by another strand of 
literature attempting to explain economic growth differentials across countries by 
differences in a well-constructed 'index of economic freedom.' Generally these indexes 
attempt to condense into a single number the degree of economic freedom individuals 
have in a geographic area in several key categories such as low taxes, low regulations, 
and secure property rights. Studies using these indices such as Gwartney and Lawson 
(2002), Farr, Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998), and Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe 
(1999), have generally found that countries with a higher economic freedom score not 
only have larger per capita incomes, but also tend to have higher rates of economic 
growth.   
In this chapter it is proposed that the 'missing link' that has yet to be demonstrated 
between economic freedom and economic growth is entrepreneurial activity. That is, 
underlying economic freedoms generate growth because they promote underlying 
entrepreneurial activity, which is then the source of economic growth. To illustrate the 
relationship between economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity, Figure 4.1 shows 
the relationship between state economic freedom scores and the growth rate of sole 
proprietors from 1996 to 2000. The scatter plot of the raw data is supported by a simple 
regression line fit between the two variables. The positive correlation can be seen clearly 
in the figure, which shows that the states with more economic freedom experienced 
higher growth rates in entrepreneurship.  
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Figure 4.1 Relationship between State Economic Freedom and  






























While this relationship between economic freedom and economic growth has 
never directly been tested in the literature, this view is highlighted by Lee (1991) who 
writes: 
no matter how fertile the seeds of entrepreneurship, they wither without the 
proper economic soil. In order for entrepreneurship to germinate, take root, and 
yield the fruit of economic progress it has to be nourished by the right mixture of 
freedom and accountability, a mixture that can only be provided by a free market 
economy. The productivity of all economic activity is enhanced greatly by the 
freedom and discipline found only in market economies. [Lee (1991), p. 50] 
 
To verify this hypothesis, and to more rigorously test the link between freedom and 
entrepreneurship, I gathered data across U.S. states on the growth of entrepreneurial 
activity in each state, other key factors that have previously been shown to be correlated 
with entrepreneurial activity for that state, and the degree of economic freedom in the 
state. State control variables were chosen in a manner that is consistent with the variables 
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proposed in the previous literature. However, in modeling entrepreneurship, the existing 
literature has mainly focused on the question of what characterizes an individual 
entrepreneur. 48  So this analys is, which aggregates up to the state level, will be the first 
attempt to model the existing states’ environments for entrepreneurship.  
There are three somewhat different strands of literature aiming to explain 
entrepreneurs. First, there are the studies looking at different demographic characteristics 
of the individuals pursuing entrepreneurship. Second there are the studies that have 
looked at more economic influences leading to entrepreneurship. Finally, there are those 
studies that aim to analyze which policies affect entrepreneurial activities.  
Evans and Leighton (1989) model individual entrepreneurs and find that an 
individual’s age, gender, and work experience affect the decision to enter or stay in 
entrepreneurial activities. Bates (1990) shows that an individual’s human capital, in other 
words educational background, is a significant determinant in the entrepreneurial process. 
Schiller and Crewson (1997) also conclude that demographics matter, showing that the 
influences of age, education, and experience affect men and women differently in the 
decisions to supply entrepreneurial activity. Most recently, Cowling (2000) confirms that 
age, gender, and education are key variables in determining what individuals become 
entrepreneurs. 
                                                 
48 The model that has been developed by the existing literature has focused on explaining 
individual entrepreneurs measured as sole proprietors, or more generally the self-
employed. This chapter has introduced another indicator of entrepreneurial activity, 
patent activity, so the existing model of entrepreneurship will also be applied to modeling 
the determinants of patents. However, it should be noted that the two indicators of 
entrepreneurship are quite different in nature, so the existing model of sole proprietors 
may behave differently when applied to modeling the determinants of patent activity. In 
any event, applying the existing model of entrepreneurship to this new indicator of 
entrepreneurial activity is a useful exercise. 
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The economic influences on entrepreneurial activity have mainly focused on an 
individual’s inheritance or financial gifts received, or the incentives to be your own boss. 
Note that the financial inheritances do not work in the same manner as venture capital. 
The inheritance matters more in the decision to become an entrepreneur, while the 
venture capital matters more once that decision is made. The importance of an 
individual’s personal finances is found to hold true in Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 
(1994), who analyze the behavior of a group of sole proprietors that received significant 
inheritances and found that they are more likely to start and survive in an entrepreneurial 
endeavor than those proprietors without substantial personal finances. Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1998) used various micro data sets of the self-employed to answer the question 
of what makes an entrepreneur. The authors show that personal financing is one of the 
most important factors leading to self-employment, noting that the probability of self-
employment depends positively on an individual’s inheritance or financial gifts received. 
In regards to the managerial gains of entrepreneurship, Wiggins (1995) focuses on the 
incentives of ownership in explaining small business entrepreneurial activity. In line with 
this argument, Hamilton (2000) claims that many individuals choose to be entrepreneurs 
because self-employment offers significant non-pecuniary benefits such as “being your 
own boss.”  
More relevant to the aims of this research is the strand of literature focusing on 
policy influences on entrepreneurship. Blau (1987) uses time series data on U.S. self 
employment and generally concludes that high marginal tax rates produce higher rates of 
self employment because the higher taxes give workers the incentive to leave wage-and-
salary jobs and move into entrepreneurial activity where they can more easily evade the 
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taxes. Kayne (1999) performs a general state policy inventory survey to report on what 
state policies are in place to support entrepreneurial activities. The author finds that 
certain states are making efforts to reduce taxes and business regulations, improve 
venture capital networking, and increase support for education in support of 
entrepreneurship. Returning the focus to tax influences, Bruce (2000) examines income 
and payroll taxes of the self-employed and wage-and-salary workers to see if tax 
differentials affect the choice to be self employed. The author finds that the differential 
tax treatment of wage-and-salary and self-employment income significantly affects the 
probability of leaving self employment for a wage-and-salary job. Bruce (2002) extends 
his original work to allow for the endogeneity of individual tax rates, and the author finds 
that taxes have mixed effects on the level of entrepreneurial activity. Bruce’s results 
highlight the overall findings of the previous literature that have not presented conclusive 
evidence on the relationship between tax rates and entrepreneurial activity, and have at 
best, shown only a weak relationship holds.49 
Building on the existing literature, the current analysis will be the first to perform 
a comprehensive study of state policies in the fifty states and their effects on the 
environment for entrepreneurship. Annual growth rates of sole proprietorships, as a 
measure of state entrepreneurial growth, will be estimated empirically based on various 
explanatory variables that are supported by the literature. For example, the demographic 
make up and the underlying economic characteristics of each state should influence the 
state’s ability to generate entrepreneurial activity.  
                                                 
49 For a good revue of the literature on the relationship between taxes and 
entrepreneurship refer to Bruce (2002). 
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The variables included to capture the demographic characteristics of 
entrepreneurs are population statistics on the median age, percent males, percent white, 
percent receiving a high school education, and percent receiving a college education are 
controlled for in each regression specification. The median age could have either a 
positive or negative effect on entrepreneurship. One argument is that as age increases you 
become more likely to become an entrepreneur because you have more built up human 
capital, and you have more business experience that might lead you into starting your 
own business. However, as an individual’s age increases they may also become more 
income-risk-averse. Since entrepreneurial ventures are characterized by increased risk, 
they may be undertaken by younger, more risk- loving individuals.  
The percent males and percent white could also carry either a positive or negative 
sign. Past studies have not shown conclusive evidence in either direction for either 
variable, but more evidence has supported the notion that women and minorities are less 
likely to become entrepreneurs. However, recent market trends have shown a movement 
towards women and minority owned businesses, particularly since the Small Business 
Administration has devoted efforts towards targeting women and minorities for new 
entrepreneurial ventures.50 So, this might drive the estimates of percent males and percent 
white to carry a negative sign.  
Finally, the influence of an individual’s level of education has also had mixed 
results in the literature. In particular, there has been some evidence that entrepreneurial 
activity is heightened by both low levels of education (high school diploma) and very 
                                                 
50 For more information on the Small Business Administrations efforts towards women 
and minorities, and more generally on the increasing role of women and minority owned 
businesses, refer to U.S. Small Business Administration, Women in Business, 2001 and 
Minorities in Business 2001. 
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high levels of education (advanced degrees, such as doctors and lawyers that are usually 
classified as proprietors). Therefore, the signs on percent high school and percent college 
could be either positive or negative. However, evidence might point to the finding that 
high school education leads to greater entrepreneurial activity, while college education 
leads to less entrepreneurial activity. 51 
Also, other state demographic variables were incorporated in each regression to 
capture the economic differences in the states, which include such variables as the 
unemployment rate, percent union members, percent employed in service industries, and 
crime rates. The unemployment rate is expected to exert a positive influence on state 
entrepreneurship because less employment opportunities would give more incentives for 
individuals to start their own businesses. The percent union membership is expected to 
carry a negative sign because union members are more prone to seek wage-and-salary 
jobs in the unionized industries. As noted by Blau (1987), the industries in which 
entrepreneurship is more relatively common are typically the service and retail trade 
sectors. Thus, the percent in services industry is expected to carry a positive sign because 
it is more attractive, and somewhat easier, for entrepreneurs to pursue ventures in a 
service industry. 52 The crime rate is expected to carry a negative sign because crime is a 
direct threat to the rewards of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs will inherently gravitate to 
those areas that have better property right protection; more specifically, those areas that 
                                                 
51 A further, informal, explanation, which came in part from conversations with Don 
Bruce, may be that a high school education gives an individual the basic training and 
understanding needed to start his or her own business without specifying a certain way of 
thinking or performing tasks, while a college education trains an individual to think in a 
more specialized field, which maybe better suited for a wage-and-salary job. 
52 The BLS refers to a service industry as the following: transportation, communications, 
electric, gas, and sanitary services; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance insurance, and 
real estate; and services. 
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have a greater probability of being able to keep and enjoy the benefits of 
entrepreneurship.  
In addition to the basic model of entrepreneurial activity, several state policy 
variables were incorporated in the estimation process to see which, if any, significantly 
affect the state’s ability to generate underlying entrepreneurial activity. For example, 
different state laws and taxes, such as tax limitation laws, inheritance or death taxes, and 
minimum wage laws were included as possible influences on the state environment for 
entrepreneurship. Tax limitation laws require a supermajority of votes to increase or 
impose taxes, which can serve as a means to keep the growth of taxes, and government in 
general, in check. Less involvement of government may lead to a more suitable 
environment for creativity and entrepreneurial activity, so the tax limitation law is 
expected to be positively correlated with entrepreneurship.  
Recall that Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) and Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1998) find evidence that an individual’s inheritance increases the probability of 
entering and succeeding in an entrepreneurial venture. Thus, death taxes and inheritance 
taxes, which directly reduce the ability of entrepreneurs to pass on their entrepreneurial 
gains to fund future generations of entrepreneurs, should lead to less entrepreneurial 
activity in the states that enact such laws. More directly related to the analysis of death 
taxes, Holtz-Eakin (1999), in a survey of the literature on estate taxes, concludes that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to bare the burden of estate taxes because they are 
inherently more exposed to the taxation of wealth accumulation. This direct affect of 
estate taxes on the rewards of entrepreneurship should lead to less entrepreneurial 
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activity. In other words, the presence of higher state death taxes is expected to be 
negatively correlated with entrepreneurial activity in the states. 
Finally, some states have elected to adopt minimum wage laws that set their 
minimum wage at a higher level than the national minimum wage. The minimum wage 
may have two effects on entrepreneurial ability. First, it serves as a disincentive to 
transition from wage employment to entrepreneurship, because the pay is higher. Second, 
it serves as a proxy for the labor costs of opening your own business. Essentially, 
entrepreneurs starting their own business will have to pay their employees the higher 
minimum wage if they start their business in one of the states with the higher minimum 
wage. Thus, the minimum wage is expected to carry a negative sign.  
As noted earlier, one of the propositions of this chapter is that a state’s underlying 
economic freedom is an essential determinant of the state’s ability to create and attract 
entrepreneurial activity. Karabegovic, McMahon, and Samida (2002) have developed an 
economic freedom index score for each state, which is a composite index measure of 
many state policies that affect the economic freedom of individuals in that state. More 
specifically, the index is based on the size of government, discriminatory taxation, the 
degree of business regulation, and labor market flexibility.53 The economic freedom 
index is expected to carry a positive sign showing that more economic freedom will 
create and attract more entrepreneurial activity.  
                                                 
53 The three index areas include the following indicators: the size of government is based 
on general government purchases, transfer payments, and subsidies; the discriminatory 
taxation is based on total government revenue, income tax rates and thresholds, indirect 
taxes, and sales taxes; and the labor market flexibility is based on minimum wage 
earnings, government employment, and occupational licensing. 
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 In order to be consistent with the earlier causality analysis, the testing of which 
state policies and characteristics influence entrepreneurship will involve a unique method 
of modeling. Specifically, the analysis focuses on what policies and characteristics were 
in place in each state that led to their different experiences of growth in entrepreneurial 
activity during the current sample period. To implement this methodology, only the 
values of the state explanatory variables in the initial year are used to see which variables 
significantly impact each state’s growth rate of entrepreneurship over the following five 
years. This technique still tries to get at the heart of causality, in that it takes the existing 
state characteristics at one point in time and asks what characteristics lead to 
entrepreneurial growth in the next time period.  For example, it tests whether those states 
with more economic freedom in 1996 experienced more entrepreneurial growth over the 
next five years relative to those states with less economic freedom.  
The estimated determinants of entrepreneurial growth are presented in Tables 4.4 
and 4.5, and the formal estimated regression takes the following general functional form. 
EGRi = βi + ∑
x=1
X
 βx DEMx,i    +  ∑
y=1
Y
 βy POLy,i    + βz FREEi   (4.3) 
where EGRi is the growth rate of sole proprietors, or patent activity, from 1996-2000 in 
state i, DEMi is a set of demographic and economic control variables for state i, POLi is a 
set of political variables for state i, and FREEi is the economic freedom index for state i. 
Note that the explanatory variables are all from 1996. Also, note that the regression 




Table 4.4 Estimated Determinants of State Entrepreneurial Growth, 1996-2000 
Dependent Variable: State Sole Proprietor Growth Rates 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Policy Variables      
    Economic Freedom Index 3.429*** 3.425*** 3.625*** 3.514*** 
  (3.18) (3.19) (3.44) (3.19) 
    Death Tax Law -2.087** -2.149** -2.164**   
  (2.11) (2.18) (2.20)   
    Tax Limitation Law 0.877 1.060    
  (0.77) (0.94)    
    Minimum Wage -7.134     
  (0.95)     
          
State Control Variables      
    Constant 23.835 -10.047 -16.719 -13.436 
  (0.48) (0.29) (0.49) (0.37) 
    Percent with High School Degree 0.471** 0.378** 0.424*** 0.483*** 
  (2.49) (2.34) (2.76) (3.04) 
    Percent with College Degree -0.465*** -0.441*** -0.474*** -0.510*** 
 (2.93) (2.82) (3.11) (3.21) 
    Percent Males -0.332 -0.270 -0.259 -0.366 
  (0.60) (0.49) (0.47) (0.64) 
    Percent White -0.083 -0.043 -0.050 -0.039 
  (1.21) (0.80) (0.93) (0.71) 
    Median Age -0.728* -0.684* -0.634* -0.772** 
  (1.97) (1.87) (1.76) (2.07) 
    Unemployment Rate 1.728** 1.428** 1.541** 1.766*** 
  (2.59) (2.44) (2.69) (2.99) 
    Percent Union Membership -0.450*** -0.465*** -0.502*** -0.515*** 
  (3.73) (3.90) (4.45) (4.36) 
    Percent Service Employment 0.834*** 0.837*** 0.866*** 0.922*** 
  (4.65) (4.68) (4.91) (5.05) 
    Violent Crime Rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.75) (0.50) (0.40) (0.34) 
          
       
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.64 
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Table 4.5 Estimated Determinants of State Entrepreneurial Growth, 1996-2000
 Dependent Variable: State Patent Activity Growth Rates 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Policy Variables      
    Economic Freedom Index 1.871 1.885 3.985 3.965 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.65) (0.65) 
    Death Tax Law -0.436 -0.244 -0.400  
  (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)  
    Tax Limitation Law 11.680* 11.113*   
  (1.78) (1.74)   
    Minimum Wage 22.204    
  (0.52)    
      
State Control Variables     
    Constant -224.034 -118.572 -188.554 -187.947 
  (0.78) (0.60) (0.94) (0.95) 
    Percent with High School Degree -1.856* -1.568* -1.084 -1.073 
  (1.71) (1.71) (1.20) (1.23) 
    Percent with College Degree 0.552 0.477 0.133 0.127 
 (0.61) (0.54) (0.15) (0.15) 
    Percent Males 5.596* 5.404* 5.522* 5.502* 
  (1.77) (1.74) (1.73) (1.75) 
    Percent White 0.221 0.096 0.023 0.025 
  (0.56) (0.31) (0.07) (0.08) 
    Median Age 0.017 -0.119 0.401 0.376 
  (0.01) (0.06) (0.19) (0.18) 
    Unemployment Rate -7.796** -6.862** -5.676* -5.634* 
  (2.04) (2.06) (1.70) (1.74) 
    Percent Union Membership 0.028 0.077 -0.305 -0.307 
  (0.04) (0.11) (0.46) (0.47) 
    Percent Service Employment -0.708 -0.719 -0.421 -0.411 
  (0.69) (0.71) (0.41) (0.41) 
    Violent Crime Rate -0.024 -0.026* -0.024 -0.024 
  (1.57) (1.81) (1.59) (1.61) 
      
      
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34 
          
 




The first part of the results discussion will focus on the estimated determinants of 
sole proprietors because this is the measure that follows what has been analyzed 
extensively in the previous literature and is the indicator of entrepreneurial activity that 
the model was intended for. The second part of the results discussion will focus on the 
estimated determinants of patent activity, and will make relevant comparisons to the 
results presented for the sole proprietorship measure.  
Referring to the estimated determinants of sole proprietor growth, presented in 
Table 4.4, the economic freedom index is significant at the 1% level or better in all four 
regressions. Thus, the states with the most economic freedom in 1996 had the highest 
subsequent growth of entrepreneurial activity over the next five years, as measured by 
sole proprietors. Therefore, states policy makers need to ensure economic freedom exists 
in their state in order to promote entrepreneurial growth. It is important to point out, 
however, that economic freedom consists of an environment of low taxes, low 
regulations, and secure private property rights, and these factors do not simply work 
individually, but rather only as a complementary group. 
Out of the remaining three policy variables, the only one that was found to 
significantly influence state entrepreneurial growth was the presence of state death 
(inheritance) taxes. In the three specifications when it is included, state death 
(inheritance) taxes are found to be highly significant in explaining the growth of 
entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, the presence of state death taxes beyond the federal 
level exerts a negative influence on the growth of state entrepreneurial activity. There are 
two possible explanations for this relationship. First, as supported by Holtz-Eakin (1999), 
high death taxes directly reduce the reward from entrepreneurship and lower the ability of 
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the entrepreneur to pass on wealth to his or her children. Second, many studies, such as 
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), have 
found inheritance to be a significant factor increasing the likelihood of an individual 
becoming an entrepreneur. The reason for this is that inheritance often provides the seed 
funding necessary to develop and finance a new venture up until the point at which it 
becomes possible to secure outside debt or venture funding. The other two policy 
variables (minimum wage rate and the presence of a tax limitation law) are insignificant 
in the regression specifications in which they are included.   
The economic control variables that were consistently significant (and all of the 
expected signs) were the unemployment rate, percent union membership, and percent 
service-sector employment. This shows that the characteristics of the state economies are 
also major determinants of the growth of state entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, the 
results show that states with high unemployment rates, or low availability of employment 
opportunities, experience more growth of entrepreneurial activity because of the added 
incentives for individuals to start their own business (or create their own employment 
opportunities). Also, the findings suggest that highly unionized states experience less 
growth in entrepreneurial activity, while states that are characterized as having larger 
service sectors in their economies experience more growth in entrepreneurial activity. 
The final economic control variable, the crime rate, was found to be insignificant in all 
the regression specifications. 
The demographic control variables that were consistently significant (and all of 
the expected signs) were the percent with high school degree, percent with college 
degree, and median age. This shows that the demographic characteristics of the 
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individuals participating in the state economies are also major determinants of the growth 
of state entrepreneurship. Specifically, the percent of the population receiving a high 
school education exerts a positive and significant influence on state entrepreneurial 
growth, while the percent of the population receiving a college education exerts a 
negative and significant influence on state entrepreneurial growth. Also, younger state 
populations are found to experience increased entrepreneurial growth. The other two 
demographic variables (percent males and percent white) are insignificant in all 
regressions. 
Focusing attention on the determinants of patent activity growth that are presented 
in Table 4.5, reveals that the two indicators of entrepreneurial activity are quite different 
in nature.54 Out of the policy variables, only tax limitation laws exerted a significant 
influence on patent growth rates. The results show that those states with tax limitation 
laws experience higher growth rates of entrepreneurial activity relative to those states 
without such laws. This finding lends some support to the notion of creating a suitable 
environment for entrepreneurs by keeping taxes low, in that the tax limitation laws 
require a super majority vote to increase taxes. The freedom index and death taxes both 
retained their expected signs, but did not retain significance in any of the regressions that 
they were included. The finding that freedom does not significantly influence patent 
activity is somewhat surprising, and may be the product of the model that is used to 
estimate the determinants of patent activity. The finding of no significant influence of 
death taxes is somewhat less surprising given that they inherently affect individual 
                                                 
54 It should be noted again that the original model of entrepreneurial activity was 
designed to explain sole proprietors, or more generally the self-employed, so the control 
variables, when applied to patent activity may have understandably different influences. 
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business owners rather than corporate firms, which generally are credited with a majority 
of the patents granted in the United States.55 
The only economic variable that exerted a significant impact on patent activity 
throughout each regression was the unemployment rate. However, the unemployment rate 
switched to a negative sign, where it was found to carry a positive sign when modeling 
sole proprietors. Again this difference comes from the fact that the two indicators of 
entrepreneurial activity are inherently different. The negative impact of unemployment 
on patent activity suggest that high unemployment states experience less patent activity 
growth. This can be attributed to the fact that when state economies take downturns ( as 
characterized by unemployment increases) corporations often respond by first cutting 
research and development efforts, which will directly decrease the innovative capacity of 
that state. The violent crime rate was found to negatively impact patent activity and was 
significant in one of the four regressions it was included. This shows that protection of 
property is a key determinant of entrepreneurial growth. The percent service and percent 
union were not found to significantly impact patent activity growth, however, it is 
interesting to note that both variables switched signs (percent service became negative, 
and percent union became positive). This shows that when modeling patent activity, 
states characterized as having mostly service industries will have less patent activity, and 
states characterized as having high levels of union membership will produce more patent 
activity. These results seem to make intuitive sense in that more industrial, unionized 
industries may be more driven towards innovation and invention than service industries. 
                                                 
55 According to Griliches (1990) roughly 73 percent of U.S. patents go to corporations, 
while about 25 percent are received by individual inventors. 
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Out of the demographic control variables, only percent high school education and 
percent males exerted a significant influence on patent activity. It is interesting to note 
that the two measures of educational attainment switched signs when comparing to the 
results for the estimated determinants of sole proprietorships. Specifically, as the percent 
of the labor force that only receives a high school education increases, the resulting 
patent activity significantly decreases. While, as the percent of the labor force receiving a 
college education increases, the resulting level of patent activity increases. This follows 
the conventional logic that higher educational attainment will lead to more innovative 
capacity for individuals, which is needed to produce patents. In addition to the finding 
that education significantly impacts patent activity, the percent of the labor force that is 
male exerts a positive and significant influence on patent activity; however, the percent 
white and median age did not significantly influence patent activity.  
Taken as a whole, the results from the previous two sections have significant 
policy implications for state and local development agencies.56 To encourage economic 
growth, localities must encourage entrepreneurial activity, and to do so, they must focus 
on creating an environment consistent with economic freedom, rather than focusing 
efforts on bringing in more venture capital to the area.  Again, a state’s economic 
freedom consists of an environment of low taxes, low regulations, and secure private 
property rights, where these factors collectively work to produce economic freedoms. 
                                                 
56 In order to check the robustness of the results from both Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, the 
same regressions were run using per capita measures of the two dependent variables; 
specifically, per capita proprietor growth and per capita patent growth. The results of this 
exercise are presented in the Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6 respectively, and the results 
generally support the findings when using the non-per capita growth rates as presented in 
Tables 4.4 and Table 4.5. 
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Low taxes, for example, by themselves will not encourage entrepreneurial activity 
without the other factors (such as low regulations and secure property rights) in place. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The chapter began by demonstrating that the previously documented link between 
entrepreneurial activity and economic growth also holds up in comparisons among U.S. 
states.  Local economic development efforts have recently recognized this link and have 
begun to enact policies specifically targeted at increasing entrepreneurial activity.  Many 
localities have focused these efforts toward forming formal angel networks and attracting 
new venture capital investment funds. The underlying, but unsubstantiated, assumption is 
that more venture capital will cause more successful entrepreneurial activity to arise.  
Recently, however, some have questioned whether the limited resources available for 
development efforts would be better directed toward attracting and nurturing individual 
entrepreneurs. 
 The state panel causality tests performed in this chapter conclude that there is a 
one-way causal relationship between state entrepreneurial activity and venture capital 
investment, but that the direction of this causal relationship is that entrepreneurial activity 
causes an inflow of venture funding, and not vice versa.  Because entrepreneurial activity 
tends to be the underlying factor that automatically and naturally attracts more venture 
capital to an area, economic development policies should focus on creating an 
environment attractive to individual entrepreneurs, rather than on attracting venture 
capital. 
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 Data on the growth of entrepreneurial activity, other key factors that have 
previously been shown to be correlated with entrepreneurial activity, and the degree of 
economic freedom were gathered individually for all fifty states. Generally, the results 
support the notion that an area’s overall economic freedom, created by the state’s public 
policies, significantly impacts the underlying level of entrepreneurial activity. Put simply, 
an environment of low taxes, low regulations, and secure private property rights is what 
is necessary to encourage the entrepreneurial activity that is vital to produce economic 
growth.   
In addition to the clear implications that the results have for economic 
development efforts, they also provide a significant contribution to the growing literature 
on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth.  This relationship 
has previously been demonstrated across countries, and the results show that this 
relationship also holds across U.S. states.  Most importantly, these results fill in the 
'missing link' in this well-documented relationship.  In particular results show that the 
conduit between economic freedom and economic growth is entrepreneurial activity. 
That is, underlying economic freedoms generate growth because they promote 
underlying entrepreneurial activity. In addition to the contributions mentioned above, my 
analysis also calls attention to the importance of the measure of entrepreneurial activity 
that is used to model entrepreneurship.  
This chapter introduces a new indicator of entrepreneurial activity—patent 
activity—that was shown to behave quite differently from the more conventional measure 
of sole proprietors. The difference can be attributed to the fact that the patents are 
capturing the direct outcome of high-growth entrepreneurial ventures, while the sole 
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proprietorship measure is inherently also capturing the lifestyle entrepreneur. Clearly 
more effort needs to be devoted to designing a new indicator of entrepreneurial activity, 
one that has the ability to distinguish between lifestyle entrepreneurship and high-growth 
entrepreneurial activity. In order to accomplish this task, an entrepreneurial index may 
need to be created that weights such indicators as sole proprietors and patent activity to 
get an overall composite index of an area’s entrepreneurial activity. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Areas of Future Research 
One aspect of public choice analysis focuses on the effect that political constraints have 
on individual economic behavior. Generally, the term “political constraint” can have two 
different meanings. The first meaning refers to the constraints that are self-imposed on the 
political process, which include such things as constitutional laws, voting rules, election 
mechanisms, and many other factors. The second meaning refers to the constraints that 
are created by the political process and imposed on the individuals who participate in the 
economy, which include such things as an established and enforced system of private 
property, a legal system of laws and regulations, enactment of mandatory taxes, and 
many other factors. 
The notion that individuals, including both political and market participants, make 
rational choices under a given set of constraints, which are often created by the political 
process, has long been applied by various strands of economic literature. For example, 
economists are analyzing the economic implications of constitutions, voting mechanisms, 
different laws and regulations (and the crimes that result from disobeying them), and 
various aspects of taxation. This dissertation contributes to this vast literature dealing 
with choices under constraints by presenting specific applications of the two meanings of 
political constraints.  
These specific applications are contained in the three research chapters of this 
dissertation. Chapter 2 analyzes of the constraints that are self- imposed on the political 
process and the incentives for politicians to avoid such constraints in pursuit of their own 
interests, by comparing the efficiency of two distinctly different forms of city 
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government. The next two chapters present analysis of the constraints that are created by 
the political process and how they influence individual economic behavior. Chapter 3 
investigates the effect that the U.S. minimum drinking age law has on the behavior of 
underage citizens that are located in areas that share borders with nations having lower 
drinking ages. Chapter 4 examines the effect that state policies, such as tax structures and 
regulations, has on the choice of individua ls to pursue entrepreneurial ventures.  
The remainder of the current chapter will (i) summarize the major findings of 
each of the three research chapters, (ii) highlight the importance of each finding in 
regards to the existing literature, and (iii) propose suggestions for future research. 
Chapter 2 compares and contrasts two forms of city government, ultimately 
comparing professionally trained city managers to popular elected mayors in order to 
predict efficiency differences in the two forms of government. The motivation is that the 
elected officials will be subject to many of the efficiencies brought on by incentives to 
vote maximize; while the professionally trained city manager, who is removed from 
direct voting influences, will perform more efficiently relative to the popularly elected 
mayor. Previous research, that examines a limited array of common government 
expenditures, has concluded that there are no efficiency differences between elected 
mayor-council (EMC) and council-manager (CM) city governments. What remains then, 
is a puzzle as to why so many cities are switching from an EMC form to a CM form. 
Relying on capitalization theory of local public services and taxes, I propose an 
alternative method for testing efficiency difference in the two forms of government, 
which specifically involves developing a hedonic price model for home sales occurring in 
the six largest Ohio metropolitan areas. Results show that houses within a CM city have a 
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significant pricing premium that can be attributed to the greater efficiency of the CM 
form of government. More specifically, the CM pricing premium is more pronounced in 
the central cities that were analyzed, which suggests that the influence of the city 
manager may vary between central cities and the surrounding cities. 
These results make an important contribution to the literature in that they are the 
first results since Booms (1966) that point to significant efficiency differences in the two 
forms of city government. Also, the efficiency advantage can be used to explain the 
current trend towards adopting the CM form of city government in the United States. The 
cities making the transition to the CM form of government have to receive some benefits 
from the change, and the benefits may come in the form of efficiency gains. Finally, the 
alternative methodology employed sheds some doubt on the use of common government 
expenditures to test for differences in city forms of government. The results point to the 
fact that variations in the total value of the public services produced, and the efficiency of 
the manner in which they were produced, may be better suited to reveal differences in the 
two forms of city government. 
There are a few extensions of this line of research that may be worth 
investigating. First, the finding that the CM influence is more pronounced in the central 
city housing market could be further examined. Second, additional methods of testing the 
two forms of government could be performed. Such as, looking at business start-ups 
(business growth) in different cities to see if city managers promote more business 
activity. Also, analysis of city population migration could prove to be beneficial, under 
the Tiebout-type assumption that cities offering a superior basket of public goods will 
attract more residents (net in-migration). A simple test of these two hypotheses would be 
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to see if CM cities have significantly higher business start-up rates or population in-
migration rates than EMC cities. Clearly my findings, of significant efficiency 
differences that were not found by the previous literature, suggests that the issue still 
needs further investigation beyond what has been previously examined. 
Chapter 3 analyzes how minimum drinking age laws influence the behavior of 
underage citizens. More specifically, it examines the incentive for underage U.S. citizens 
to cross international borders into countries with lower drinking ages to avoid the 
nationally uniform 21-year-old drinking age. The chapter models the occurrence of 
alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities, the most serious outcome of mixing drinking and 
driving, and tests for any border crossing effects. More specifically, I model the 
occurrence of motor-vehicle fatalities in Michigan counties, for drivers aged nineteen and 
twenty, and all-aged drivers, to test if the lower Ontario drinking age of nineteen creates a 
significant border crossing effect. Results show that, after controlling for the 
determinants of motor vehicle fatalities that are supported by the literature, the county’s 
proximity to the nearest border crossing significantly impacts the occurrence of alcohol-
related motor-vehicle fatalities. Specifically, the occurrence of motor-vehicle fatalities 
increases as the distance from the nearest border crossing decreases, where the increased 
fatalities place a larger cost burden on the counties that are closest to the border 
crossings.  
The results of this chapter make an important contribution to the literature in that 
it builds of the existing minimum drinking age literature by extending it to a more 
national context. The finding that international border crossings between nations with 
different drinking ages significantly impact alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities 
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reinforces the widely accepted finding that drinking ages matter in respect to drinking 
and driving deterrence. 
Although, this study focused on Michigan-Ontario border crossings, many other 
U.S. states share borders with Canada and Mexico, where drinking ages are currently 
lower than twenty-one. The analysis performed in this chapter could be extended to 
analysis of several other states with international border crossings. Also, given that there 
was a period of time in which the fifty states did not all have a uniform drinking age, this 
methodology could be applied to more historical data to test if there was a border 
crossing effect between the states that had varying dinking ages. 
Chapter 4 focuses attention on the effects that state policies have on the level of 
entrepreneurship in each state. The chapter begins by performing causality tests between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth and shows that a one-way causal relationship runs 
from entrepreneurship to economic growth. This result serves to enhance the robustness 
of the well-supported link between entrepreneurship and economic growth. With the 
recognition that entrepreneurial activity is a key factor in economic growth, it is relevant 
to analyze the effects that various state policies have in promoting entrepreneurship. One 
frequently cited strategy for promoting entrepreneurial activity is to attract large amounts 
of venture capital, in the hopes of inducing more entrepreneurial activity. However, 
further causality tests performed on the relationship between venture capital investment 
and entrepreneurial activity show that it is the presence of entrepreneurial activity that 
draws venture funding to an area, and not vice versa.  
In order to further investigate what policies significantly affect the level of 
entrepreneurship, I estimate the determinants of state- level entrepreneurial growth. 
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Results show that, after controlling for various demographic and economic influences, 
the level of economic freedom in a state, measured by a composite index of several 
various state taxes and regulations, is a significant determinant of the growth of 
entrepreneurship. Thus, the results imply that enacting policies consistent with economic 
freedom, such as low taxes, low regulations, and secure property rights that provide a 
good environment for attracting or developing individual entrepreneurs, are the 
appropriate economic development policies. 
The results presented in this chapter contribute to the literature in several ways. 
First, the results enhance the well-established link between entrepreneurship and 
economic growth, by showing that the link still holds when aggregating to the state-level. 
Also, the causality tests that were employed allow for dual causality, but find a strong 
one-way causal relationship, which many prior studies had shown by making more 
informal observations.  
Second, the causality results performed on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and venture capital investment suggest that policymakers should 
not devote resources to attracting venture funds to their states. Rather, they should focus 
attention on creating a suitable environment for creating or attracting entrepreneurs. One 
method of creating a suitable environment is to enact policies in a manner that ensures 
that economic freedoms exist. The link between economic freedom and entrepreneurship 
is also a significant finding in that it helps to better explain the recently reported link 
between economic freedom and economic growth. In particular the results suggest that 
the conduit between economic freedom and economic growth is entrepreneurial activity. 
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That is, underlying economic freedoms generate growth because they promote underlying 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Third, this study is the first comprehensive analysis of the determinants of 
entrepreneurship performed at the state level. The findings are in- line with the prior 
analysis of entrepreneurship, which either focuses on individual entrepreneurs or 
aggregates observations to the national level. This preliminary analysis of the impact that 
state policies have on entrepreneurship opens up a new line of economic investigation, 
where this new path has much to be explored. Following what has already been done at 
the national level, further analysis could focus on the individual effects of several 
different state tax structures. Also, a wide variety of state taxes could be analyzed to see 
which, if any, exert a significant influence of the environment for entrepreneurship 
through a more rigorous time-series analysis of state policies and entrepreneurship. In 
any event, given the renewed interest in the role of entrepreneurs in the economy, further 
investigation of the determinants of state entrepreneurship does seem like it would be a 
particularly fruitful exercise.  
Finally, this chapter introduces a new indicator of entrepreneurial activity—patent 
activity—that was shown to behave quite differently from the more conventional measure 
of sole proprietors. Clearly more effort needs to be devoted to designing a new indicator 
of entrepreneurial activity, one that has the ability to distinguish between lifestyle 
entrepreneurship and high-growth entrepreneurial activity. In order to accomplish this 
task, an entrepreneurial index may need to be created that weights such indicators as sole 





Table A.1 Summary Statistics and Definitions for  
Variables used in the Appendix 
 
Variable Name (source) Description Mean (st. dev.) 
Causality Test Variables   
Per Capita GSP Growth  
 
 
Annual percent change in Gross State Product per 
employee, calculated as:  
((GSPPCt – GSPPCt-1)/ GSPPCt-1) 
4.44 
(3.41) 
Sole Proprietors Per Capita 
 
 





Proprietors Per Capita Growth 
 
 
Annual percent change in Sole Propriet ors per employee, 
calculated as: 
((PROPPCt – PROPPCt-1)/ PROPPCt-1) 
1.29 
(3.46) 
Patents Per Capita 
 
 





Patents Per Capita Growth 
 
 
Annual percent change in patents per employee, 
calculated as: 
((PATPCt – PATPCt -1)/ PATPCt-1) 
4.93 
(17.34) 
Venture Capital Per Firm 
 
 





Entrepreneurial Growth Variables    
Per Capita Proprietor Growth 
 
 
Percent change in Sole Proprietors per employee, 
calculated as: 
 ((PROPPC2000 – PROPPC1996)/ PROPPC1996) 
1.68 
(2.84) 
Per Capita Patent Growth 
 
 













Table A.2 Causality Test Results between State Entrepreneurial Activity and Economic Growth 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Note: State Dummy Variables were included in each regression specification, and the estimated coefficients are available upon request 
to the author. 
 Annual Per Capita GSP Growth Sole Proprietors Per Capita Patents Per Capita 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Annual Per Capita GSP Growth (t-1) 0.223*** 0.279*** -0.283***  -0.001  
    (percent) (6.98) (9.56) (7.58)  (0.18)  
        
Sole Proprietors Per Capita (t-1) 0.049***  0.820*** 0.847***  0.002* 
    (proprietors per 1,000 employees) (4.54)  (63.99) (63.77)  (1.61) 
        
Patents Per Capita (t-1)  2.761**  4.773*** 1.031*** 1.017*** 
    (patents per 1,000 employees)  (2.01)  (2.62) (61.96) (54.83) 
        
        
Result/Finding Proprietors Patents Per Capita Patents Per Capita Proprietors 
  Per Capita Per Capita GSP Growth Per Capita GSP Growth Per Capita 
  Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes 
 Per Capita Per Capita Proprietors  Proprietors  Patents  Patents 
 GSP Growth GSP Growth Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita 
F-statistic [1, 998] 20.59*** 4.03** 57.38*** 6.85*** 0.03 2.59* 
        
        
Number of Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 
R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.95 
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Table A.3 Causality Test Results between State Entrepreneurial Activity and Economic Growth 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Note: State Dummy Variables were included in each regression specification, and the estimated coefficients are available upon request 
to the author. 
 Annual Per Capita GSP Growth Proprietors Per Capita Growth Patents Per Capita Growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Annual Per Capita GSP Growth (t-1) 0.297*** 0.284*** -0.016  -0.091  
    (percent) (10.02) (9.84) (0.64)  (0.79)  
        
Proprietors Per Capita Growth (t-1) 0.053  -0.084*** -0.080***  -0.285** 
    (percent) (1.44)  (2.63) (2.57)  (1.99) 
        
Patents Per Capita Growth (t-1)  0.010  -0.002 -0.357*** -0.359*** 
    (percent)    (0.43) (13.34) (13.44) 
        
        
Result/Finding Proprietors Per Patents Per Per Capita Patents Per Per Capita Proprietors Per 
  Capita Growth Capita Growth GSP Growth Capita Growth GSP Growth Capita Growth 
  Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes 
 Per Capita Per Capita Proprietors Per Proprietors Per Patents Per Patents Per 
 GSP Growth GSP Growth Capita Growth Capita Growth Capita Growth Capita Growth 
F-statistic [1, 998] 2.08 2.31 0.40 0.18 0.62 3.94** 
        
        
Number of Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.18 




Table A.4 Causality Test Results between State Entrepreneurial Activity and Venture Capital Investment 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 Venture Capital Per Firm Sole Proprietors Per Capita Patents Per Capita 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Venture Capital Per Firm  (t-1) 1.902*** 1.862*** -0.001  -0.001  
    (dollars per firm) (40.96) (39.46) (1.24)  (1.52)  
        
Sole Proprietors Per Capita (t-1) 40.845  0.765*** 0.766***  0.002*** 
    (proprietors per 1,000 employees) (1.52)  (25.81) (26.23)  (3.29) 
        
Patents Per Capita (t-1)  5133.750***  2.624 1.080*** 1.016*** 
    (patents per 1,000 employees)  (3.23)  (1.55) (28.65) (28.52) 
        
        
 Result/Finding Sole Proprietors Patents Venture Capital Patents Venture Capital Sole Proprietors 
  Per Capita Per Capita Per Firm Per Capita Per Firm Per Capita 
 Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes Causes 
 Venture Capital Venture Capital Sole Proprietors Sole Proprietors Patents Patents 
 Per Firm Per Firm Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita 
F-statistic [1,334] 2.29 10.45*** 1.55 2.41 2.32 10.86*** 
        
        
Number of Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.96 
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 





Table A.5 Estimated Determinants of State Entrepreneurial Growth1996-2000 
Dependent Variable: State Per Capita Proprietor Growth Rates 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Policy Variables      
    Economic Freedom Index 1.924** 1.919** 1.901** 1.848** 
  (2.49) (2.45) (2.51) (2.41) 
    Death Tax Law -0.962 -1.031 -1.029  
  (1.36) (1.43) (1.45)  
    Tax Limitation Law 0.299 0.096   
  (0.37) (0.12)   
    Minimum Wage -7.958    
  (1.48)    
      
State Control Variables     
    Constant 101.115*** 63.319** 63.926** 65.488** 
  (2.81) (2.48) (2.59) (2.62) 
    Percent with High School Degree 0.268* 0.165 0.160 0.188* 
  (1.97) (1.39) (1.44) (1.69) 
    Percent with College Degree -0.468*** -0.442*** -0.439*** -0.456*** 
 (4.11) (3.87) (3.99) (4.12) 
    Percent Males -1.301*** -1.232*** -1.233*** -1.284*** 
  (3.29) (3.09) (3.13) (3.23) 
    Percent White -0.071 -0.026 -0.025 -0.020 
  (1.44) (0.66) (0.66) (0.52) 
    Median Age -0.607** -0.558** -0.562** -0.628** 
  (2.29) (2.10) (2.16) (2.42) 
    Unemployment Rate 1.524*** 1.189*** 1.178*** 1.286*** 
  (3.19) (2.78) (2.86) (3.12) 
    Percent Union Membership -0.111 -0.128 -0.125 -0.131 
  (1.28) (1.47) (1.54) (1.59) 
    Percent Service Employment 0.245* 0.249* 0.246* 0.273** 
  (1.90) (1.91) (1.94) (2.14) 
    Violent Crime Rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.80) (0.40) (0.42) (0.38) 
      
      
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.50 
          
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10 
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Table A.6 Estimated Determinants of State Entrepreneurial Growth 1996-2000 
Dependent Variable: State Per Capita Patent Growth Rates 
(absolute t-statistics in parenthesis)  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Policy Variables      
    Economic Freedom Index 1.242 1.255 3.245 3.250 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.56) (0.57) 
    Death Tax Law 0.069 0.243 0.096  
  (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)  
    Tax Limitation Law 11.049* 10.534*   
  (1.80) (1.76)   
    Minimum Wage 20.179    
  (0.50)    
      
State Control Variables     
    Constant -169.178 -73.332 -139.666 -139.811 
  (0.63) (0.39) (0.75) (0.76) 
    Percent with High School Degree -1.879* -1.618* -1.158 -1.161 
  (1.85) (1.88) (1.38) (1.42) 
    Percent with College Degree 0.495 0.427 0.101 0.103 
 (0.58) (0.51) (0.12) (0.13) 
    Percent Males 4.865* 4.690 4.802 4.807 
  (1.65) (1.61) (1.61) (1.63) 
    Percent White 0.223 0.109 0.039 0.039 
  (0.60) (0.38) (0.14) (0.14) 
    Median Age -0.013 -0.137 0.356 0.362 
  (0.01) (0.07) (0.18) (0.19) 
    Unemployment Rate -7.619** -6.770** -5.646* -5.656* 
  (2.13) (2.18) (1.80) (1.86) 
    Percent Union Membership 0.143 0.188 -0.174 -0.173 
  (0.22) (0.30) (0.28) (0.29) 
    Percent Service Employment -0.966 -0.976 -0.693 -0.696 
  (1.01) (1.03) (0.72) (0.74) 
    Violent Crime Rate -0.221 -0.241* -0.022 -0.022 
  (1.54) (1.77) (1.56) (1.58) 
      
      
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.35 
          
 
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10 
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